The Lights Go Out in Hull: How Energy Costs Are Redrawing the Chemical Map
23 September 2026 There is a particular silence to a mothballed chemical plant. The flares die and the pipework cools, and a site built to run without pause for decades simply stops. This week, that silence descended on Saltend, on the north bank of the Humber, where Ineos began idling its three acetyls plants. Two have already ceased production and the third will follow within days. They will remain idle until further notice. What makes the moment significant is not only what these plants make but what they were. According to Ineos, they are the last world-scale acetyls units left in Europe. Every other producer on the continent has already closed, and each closure was blamed on the same thing: energy costs that could not be competed with. A problem of physics as much as price The chemistry explains the vulnerability. At Saltend, natural gas is both the energy that drives the process and the feedstock from which acetic acid, acetic anhydride and ethyl acetate are made. When gas prices rise, the whole operation becomes uneconomic, however modern the equipment or efficient the process. Prices have risen sharply. Wholesale gas in Britain and Europe has almost doubled since July, as disruption to oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz has rippled through global energy markets. “I’m sure people will find it hard to believe that we are being forced to mothball some of the most efficient plants in Europe but with gas prices now 12 times the level in the US and 8 times that of China, we just cannot compete,” said Sir Jim Ratcliffe, founder and chairman of Ineos. That 12-to-one ratio is Ineos’s own calculation. Independent market data put the gap between British and American gas nearer eight to ten times, depending on the hub and contract measured. On any measure, it is a chasm that no operational excellence can bridge. Part of a pattern, not an isolated event Hull is not an outlier. Yara mothballed its ammonia plant on the same Saltend site in early 2025. Ineos closed Britain’s last synthetic ethanol plant at Grangemouth. The acetyls business itself cut a fifth of its workforce last year. Each decision on its own might be read as a single company’s commercial choice. Taken together, they describe a structural shift: gas-based chemical production is leaving Europe. Ineos has not closed the door entirely. It is reportedly exploring direct purchases of American liquefied natural gas, a process that could take up to a year, and could restart if prices ease. It is also calling on the UK and EU to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. For now, however, a region that consumes these chemicals in large volumes no longer makes them at scale. Where the molecules go next Acetyls are rarely headline news, but they are everywhere. Acetic acid feeds coatings, adhesives and food production. Acetic anhydride is essential to pharmaceuticals, aspirin among them. Ethyl acetate is a workhorse solvent in printing inks, laminating adhesives and flexible packaging. The European manufacturers who depended on Hull have not stopped needing these materials. They have simply started looking elsewhere, to the United States, China, the Middle East and Asia more widely. That search has consequences well beyond Europe. When one major region turns to the global market in a hurry, cargoes are redirected, prices firm and lead times lengthen, including in markets that never bought from Hull. If tariffs are imposed, Chinese product shut out of Europe will seek homes elsewhere, including across Africa and Latin America. There is also a regulatory dimension. Acetic anhydride is a controlled drug precursor, so replacing supply from new origins requires rigorous licensing and end-user checks. “What happened in Hull this week will be felt far beyond Humberside,” said Russell Brill, Director of Purchasing at Gapuma Group. “When a region loses its last major source of a basic chemical, buyers do not stop needing it; they go looking elsewhere, and they all go looking at once. Our job is to make sure our customers are not caught in that rush: to know every credible origin, to secure volumes early and to be straight with people about where prices are heading.” The barometer moves At Gapuma, we have long treated the Strait of Hormuz as a barometer for the direction of global trade and finance. Most of the time, its readings show up in freight rates and insurance premiums. This week, the reading appeared somewhere far less expected: in a quiet chemical park in East Yorkshire. The lesson is uncomfortable but clear. Where chemistry gets made is increasingly decided by the price of energy, and that price is increasingly decided by geopolitics. As regional production gives way to longer, multi-origin supply chains, the distributor’s role changes. It is no longer simply a middleman. It is a shock absorber, a navigator and, at times, the difference between a production line that runs and one that stops. Hull’s plants may yet restart. Until they do, the gap they leave will be filled by those who saw it coming.
Dire Straits: The Hormuz Stalemate at Six Months
7 September 2026 The Strait of Hormuz has burned again. On Saturday, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard said it had struck three oil tankers and three US-linked vessels in the waterway, in retaliation for fresh American strikes on Iranian tankers earlier the same day, including the crude carrier M/T Kylo. It is the latest exchange in a confrontation that has now run for over six months, since the United States and Israel opened their campaign against Iran on 28 February, and it comes after barely a month of relative calm. We return to this story, as we have done repeatedly over the past six months, not simply because the flashpoint recurs, but because Hormuz has proved itself a genuine barometer for the direction of global trade and finance. Freight rates, insurance premiums, oil and gas prices, and by extension inflation expectations and interest rate decisions worldwide, all take their cue from what happens in this one stretch of water. Few single chokepoints tell you as much, as quickly, about where the global economy is heading. The toll is no longer abstract. The crisis has claimed twenty seafarers and one port worker, with thirty-five more injured; Iran alone struck at least thirteen commercial vessels in August, including a strike on the tanker MT Sidr that killed two crew. Traffic through the Strait, which normally carries around a quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade and close to a fifth of its liquefied natural gas, remains a fraction of its pre-crisis volume, and increasingly hard to verify: with more vessels switching off their transponders to avoid becoming targets, even Washington’s own figures on daily barrel flows are treated with scepticism by independent maritime analysts. Markets have responded in the only language they know. Brent crude has posted a third straight daily gain, quoted around $79 a barrel by XTB, while broader crude benchmarks tracked by Trading Economics were up roughly nine per cent on the week and trading closer to $91. The World Bank now expects energy prices to surge 24 per cent this year, the sharpest rise since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and overall commodity prices to climb 16 per cent, driven by energy, fertiliser and record metal prices. None of that is contained to the Gulf: it is arriving at exactly the moment the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan are trying to judge whether inflation is beaten or merely resting, with Friday’s US inflation print now doing double duty as a bellwether for both monetary policy and the price of keeping ships moving through Hormuz. Has a resolution become more plausible, or less? The honest answer is: less, for now, though not for want of trying. Delegations from Washington and Tehran did sit down in June around a memorandum of understanding meant to end the war; the Islamabad Talks in the spring produced their own short-lived ceasefire; the two governments have between them stood up a Persian Gulf Strait Authority and an Islamabad Memorandum as embryonic institutional scaffolding; and as recently as 25 August, the US Navy confirmed it had cleared the Strait’s principal shipping lane of more than a hundred suspected mines. Each of these is a genuine, if partial, achievement. But each has also been followed, within weeks, by a fresh exchange of fire, and this weekend’s strikes on tankers and US-linked vessels suggest the underlying dispute, over who controls passage through Hormuz, remains as unresolved as it was in February. That is the real cost of stalemate: not only the lives already lost and the tankers already burned, but a global economy that cannot fully exhale. Insurers cannot fully price Gulf risk while ceasefires keep breaking. Central banks cannot fully relax while a fifth of the world’s LNG and a quarter of its seaborne oil sit hostage to one of the narrowest, most contested shipping lanes on Earth. And companies across the commodities and chemicals trade, ourselves included, cannot plan a “normal” that keeps receding by another month, then another. A durable settlement, whatever shape it eventually takes, is not simply a diplomatic nicety; it is the precondition for the world’s freight rates, feedstock costs and interest rate decisions to return to something like predictability. Until then, the bill for uncertainty keeps being paid, by shipowners, by insurers, by consumers, and by every business that trades across this most contested of waterways. This is the latest in our ongoing coverage of the Strait of Hormuz crisis and its implications for global trade.
Panama Canal Sets New Auction Record as Korean LPG Carrier Pays $5.3 Million
26 August 2026 For the second time in a month, a South Korean shipowner has broken the record for the highest transit fee ever paid at the Panama Canal. Bloomberg reports that SK Gas, the LPG trading arm of SK Group, has agreed to pay $5.3 million for a booking slot allowing its carrier G. Spirit to transit the canal’s locks on 1 September. Without the payment, the vessel would still make the crossing, but only after a wait of up to eleven days. The record is the latest marker in a trend we highlighted last week, when the Canal Authority’s decision to cut daily transits from 3 September – falling from 36 to 34, and to 32 from 15 September – set the stage for exactly this kind of premium. It follows hard on the heels of the $4.6 million paid earlier this month by SK Shipping to move a near-identical carrier, G. Arete, on the same long-standing rotation between the Houston Ship Channel and East Asian markets. Two forces are compounding here. The first is demand-side: the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz has curtailed Gulf energy shipments to Asia, pushing up LPG prices and squeezing South Korean traders, who are reportedly seeking to offset domestic losses through more profitable positioning elsewhere in the global market. The second is supply-side: an El Niño-driven drought has forced the Canal Authority to reduce both maximum vessel draught and, from this week, the number of daily transit slots available. The result is a market in which the auction premium for priority passage has become a genuine cost of doing business rather than an occasional anomaly. For trading and logistics operators, the lesson from two record-breaking bids inside a month is the same one this drought has been signalling since it began: canal capacity is no longer a given, and route planning now needs to price that risk in as a matter of course, not an exception.
Panama Canal Authority to Cut Daily Transits as El Niño Drought Bites
21 August 2026 From 3 September, the Panama Canal Authority will reduce daily vessel transits from 36 to 34, falling further to 32 from 15 September, as a severe El Niño-driven drought depletes the freshwater lakes that feed the canal’s locks. The move reverses a period of relative ease earlier this year and lands at a moment when traffic through the waterway has already been elevated, boosted by US Gulf energy exports rerouted through the canal following disruption to the Strait of Hormuz. The numbers underline why this matters well beyond Panama. The canal carries around five per cent of global maritime trade and some 40 per cent of US container traffic, with no viable substitute on the US East Coast to Asia corridor, only a costly detour of roughly 8,000 nautical miles around Cape Horn. Vessel operators are already paying a premium to avoid delay: one auction slot changed hands for close to 4 million US dollars in early August, a figure surpassed days later by a 4.6 million dollar bid. For trading and logistics businesses, this is now a familiar pattern rather than an isolated shock. The 2023 to 2024 drought cut canal traffic by roughly a third and rippled through global supply chains for months. This second major restriction inside three years suggests freshwater scarcity, not lock capacity, has become the canal’s binding constraint, a structural risk rather than a seasonal one. At Gapuma, where our business depends on the reliable movement of commodities and speciality chemicals across borders, developments like this reinforce the value of diversified sourcing, flexible logistics planning and close attention to the routes our supply chains depend upon.
The Ice Silk Road: Welcome News, Not a Silver Bullet
17 August 2026 For commodities traders like Gapuma Group, the past few years have taught a hard lesson: it is rarely the price of the raw material itself that wrecks a budget – it is the cost and unpredictability of getting it there. Freight rates that double overnight, chokepoints that close without warning, and transit times that stretch from weeks into months have done more damage to procurement planning than any single commodity cycle. Instability in shipping, far more than instability in the commodities themselves, has been the real obstacle to budgeting with any confidence. That is why the launch of Sea Legend’s “Ice Silk Road” deserves attention. The Chinese shipping line has begun the first regular weekly container service between Ningbo and Felixstowe via Russia’s Northern Sea Route, cutting a journey that normally takes 32 to 40 days via Suez down to roughly 20. For a sector accustomed to routes hostage to the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a viable northern alternative is not a small thing. Let us be clear: this is not a silver bullet. The route runs for a matter of weeks each year, from mid-August to early October, when Arctic waters are navigable enough for ice-class vessels and Russian icebreaker escort. It depends on infrastructure and permits controlled by Rosatom, introducing a fresh layer of geopolitical exposure alongside the very chokepoints it helps traders sidestep. Volumes remain a fraction of what moves through Suez, and reliability at scale is still unproven. But logistics stability is rarely built on a single solution – it is built on options. Every additional route, however seasonal or constrained, adds resilience to a supply chain that has spent years absorbing shocks it could not plan for. If the Ice Silk Road matures into a dependable summer corridor, it becomes one more tool for traders like Gapuma to manage cost and timing risk, alongside rail links, established sea lanes and diversified sourcing. Cautious optimism, then, rather than celebration. Watch this space.
Has Oil Stopped Reacting to Politics – and Started Steering It?
4 August 2026 Brent and WTI rebounded on Tuesday, clawing back part of Monday’s sharp sell-off, with Brent trading back above $84 a barrel. Traders were left questioning whether the market had priced in a diplomatic breakthrough that, according to Tehran, does not exist. It is the latest lurch in a pattern that has defined the Strait of Hormuz crisis for months: political announcements moving crude by five, six, even seven per cent in a single session, only to reverse within a day. Monday’s decline followed President Trump’s claim that talks with Iran would resume. It unwound within twenty-four hours once Iran’s foreign ministry denied any such negotiations were under way, and a vessel was struck near Hormuz for good measure. The rhythm is now familiar enough that analysts increasingly suspect political messaging is being timed to the market itself, rather than the market simply reacting to political fact. As Kyle Rodda, senior market analyst at capital.com, put it: “Fridays are for fighting but Mondays are for the markets in Trump’s world.” It is a wry line, but it captures something real – the choreography of threat and climbdown looks increasingly calibrated to price, not the reverse. Tehran itself has accused Washington of using announcements to move financial markets rather than negotiate in good faith. Whatever the accusation’s merit, it reinforces the sense that political rhetoric is now tracking the oil price rather than setting it. Layer in OPEC+’s steady supply increases and forecasts from Goldman Sachs and Kotak Securities pointing to a cooling market into 2027, and a fragile picture emerges: crude’s fundamentals argue for lower prices, while its politics argue for volatility. For traders, distributors and buyers across the commodities and chemicals supply chain, the lesson is discipline. Headlines can move price faster than verified cargo data ever will, and a rally built on a denied negotiation is not a rally built to last. At Gapuma, we watch the shipping lanes and the barrels – not just the briefings.
Trade, Regulation and the Value of Agility
14 July 2026 Two headlines this week tell an interesting story about two very different approaches to doing business in Europe. On one hand, the European Commission has conditionally approved the Baker Hughes-Chart Industries merger, subject to a series of remedies following a detailed competition review. That is the EU’s institutional model at work, comprehensive, rules-based and regulatory. On the other, the UK has concluded a new trade agreement with Switzerland. It is another reminder that, post-Brexit, Britain is able to pursue its own commercial relationships and trade priorities. For those of us involved in international commodities and supply chains, the contrast is noteworthy. Commodity markets thrive on certainty, speed and the ability to respond quickly to changing market conditions. Traders need governments that facilitate commerce, open markets and remove unnecessary friction. While robust competition rules have an important role to play, there is also a strong case for agile trade policy that enables businesses to seize opportunities as they arise. Switzerland has long demonstrated how a relatively small nation can punch well above its weight by championing free trade, commercial pragmatism and international connectivity. The UK’s growing engagement with Switzerland suggests an ambition to embrace more of that outward-looking mindset. From the perspective of businesses operating across global commodity markets, this is an encouraging direction of travel. Success increasingly belongs to economies that can move quickly, build trusted partnerships and provide the confidence businesses need to invest, trade and grow. At Gapuma Group, we welcome policies that strengthen international trade, reduce barriers and create an environment in which businesses can compete, innovate and deliver value across global supply chains.
The relief is real… The certainty is not
1st July 2026 For four months, the price of oil has told the story of a war few people expected and fewer still know how to end. Now, as June closes, that story appears to be turning: Brent has slipped to around $73 a barrel, its steepest monthly fall since the pandemic and its worst quarter in six years. Petrol stations, freight desks and finance directors across the trading world are, for the first time since February, allowed to exhale. But exhaling is not the same as trusting what comes next. The rally in supply behind this fall in price is genuine enough. Tankers are moving through the Strait of Hormuz again, sanction waivers have loosened Iranian barrels back into a starved market, and the diplomatic language out of Washington and Tehran has, briefly, softened. Yet scratch beneath the relief and the foundations look considerably less solid than the headline number suggests. The current arrangement holding the strait open is not a settlement; it is a temporary courtesy, with Iran having agreed to forgo transit fees for just sixty days and reserving the right to reinstate them the moment that window closes. A ceasefire with an expiry date is not peace. It is an interval. It is worth asking, too, who is actually behind the falling price, because the answer is not simply optimism. Much of this year’s most consistent buying came from trend-following hedge funds, the quiet, algorithm-driven money that piled into long oil positions as the conflict escalated in spring. That money is now heading for the exit, not because the war is over, but because the trade has stopped trending. What looks like the market voting for peace is, in no small part, funds voting to bank their profits before the next headline turns against them. This is a market that has grown fluent in front-running its own volatility. Even regulators have taken notice: several unusually well-timed bets against oil, placed in the minutes before key American statements on Iran this year, are now the subject of scrutiny. Ask a commodities desk how confident it feels and the honesty is telling. Callum Macpherson, head of commodities at Investec, described the situation bluntly as ultimately unsustainable, adding that markets are simply finding ways to muddle through, because the ordinary business of buying cargoes and hedging exposure cannot pause for a war to make up its mind. That, in a sentence, is the position every trading, logistics and distribution business now finds itself in. So can this easing be relied upon as the basis for forward strategy? Not yet, and arguably not for some time. A lower oil price today buys breathing room, not certainty. Freight contracts, insurance premiums and supplier terms still need to be built for a strait that could tighten again with a single statement out of Washington or Tehran. The prudent response is not to chase the rally down, but to hedge as though the ceasefire is what it has repeatedly proven itself to be this year: fragile, reversible and provisional. The deal may hold. History this year suggests we should not assume it will.
🛢️ GAPUMA GROUP | MARKET INTELLIGENCE | 20 MAY 2026
Hormuz, Beijing and Moscow: The Geopolitics of Oil Are Being Rewritten in Real Time The movement of two Chinese supertankers through the Strait of Hormuz today – the Yuan Gui Yang and Ocean Lily, carrying approximately 4 million barrels of crude after waiting in the Gulf for more than two months – has sent an immediate and unmistakeable signal to commodity markets. Brent crude fell to as low as $110.16 a barrel on the news. This is not merely a shipping story. It is a geopolitical statement. The vessels’ passage comes as President Trump and President Xi concluded a two-day summit in Beijing, with a White House official describing the talks as “good.” US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC that China would work behind the scenes to help reopen the strait, noting that Beijing has “a much bigger interest in reopening the strait than the US does.” Beijing, characteristically, said nothing publicly about Hormuz – Chinese state media reported only that the leaders “exchanged views on major international and regional issues, such as the Middle East situation.” Silence, in diplomacy, is often the loudest language. Iran has reportedly sought to implement a toll system for vessels crossing Hormuz – a brazen assertion of sovereign authority over an international waterway that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply. That Chinese-flagged supertankers are now moving freely while broader restrictions remain in place is a pointed reminder of where true leverage lies. Meanwhile, closer to home, Prime Minister Keir Starmer has authorised the import of Russian-refined diesel and jet fuel into the UK indefinitely, alongside a temporary licence permitting the maritime transport of Russian LNG from the Sakhalin-2 and Yamal terminals. The government frames it as pragmatism. Treasury Minister Dan Tomlinson told Sky News the government was “acting pragmatically to insulate British citizens from the economic fallout of the Middle East conflict.” Critics – not least opposition leader Kemi Badenoch – see it differently: as analysts have noted, from Moscow’s perspective, it demonstrates that Western countries are “not that committed to a sanctions regime” when their own consumers feel the pinch. The broader picture is stark. Global oil supply has declined by 12.8 mb/d in total since February, with output from Gulf countries affected by the Strait’s closure running 14.4 mb/d below pre-war levels. The IEA projects a decline of 3.9 mb/d on average across 2026, assuming flows gradually resume from June. The United Nations has already cut its global growth forecast to 2.5% this year, against an estimated 3% last year, citing higher energy costs and weaker trade. For commodities and futures desks, the key questions now are whether today’s tanker movements represent a genuine reopening or a bilateral Chinese carve-out – and whether the gap between the two matters less than markets think. Wood Mackenzie has estimated Brent could approach $200 a barrel if the Strait remains largely shut until the end of the year. The downside scenario, by contrast, assumes a rapid diplomatic resolution that supply chains are ill-prepared to absorb smoothly. At Gapuma Group, we are watching these developments closely across energy, commodities and futures markets. The rules of the game are changing – and the players setting them are not all where they used to be. For market intelligence, trading insights and strategic analysis, connect with the Gapuma Group team.
The Emperor Comes to Beijing — Without His Clothes
14 May 2026 By: Shahab MOSSAVAT When Donald Trump first touched down in Beijing in November 2017, Xi Jinping laid on the full theatre of imperial hospitality: a private dinner in the Forbidden City, a parade through Tiananmen Square, and the announcement of $250 billion in business deals – a figure so grand it dwarfed the entire annual GDP of West Virginia, where one of its headline memoranda of understanding was supposedly centred. Almost none of it materialised. The symbolism, however, was exquisitely chosen. China was telling the world – and telling Trump – who was truly in charge. Nine years on, the pageantry at Beijing Capital International Airport on Wednesday – the honour guard, the schoolchildren chanting in Mandarin, the skyscrapers lit with welcoming characters – carried an almost identical message, delivered with rather more pointed subtlety. Air Force One landed, and a US president who had spent his first term threatening to break China, and his second term actually trying to, stepped onto a red carpet laid by a nation that had absorbed his blows, weaponised its advantages in response, and emerged from the encounter structurally stronger. Donald Trump is greeted at Beijing airport by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng The shift in the bilateral power dynamic is not subtle. It is measurable, documented and, for Washington, deeply uncomfortable. When Trump arrived in 2017, the United States still held most of the conventional cards: it was the world’s pre-eminent consumer market, the anchor of the dollar-denominated global financial system, and the unchallenged custodian of the rules-based international order. China was formidable but still, in important respects, dependent – on American technology, American markets and American acquiescence. Trump’s instinct, brutal in its simplicity, was to exploit that dependency through tariffs. What he did not foresee was that a decade of patient strategic investment had quietly altered the underlying geometry. Consider the arithmetic of the current summit. Trump arrives in Beijing wanting concessions: market entry for American companies, Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft and US soybeans, a softening of rare earth export restrictions that brought his own industrial economy to the edge of a supply crisis. Xi, by contrast, wants stability – time to consolidate a technological and industrial position that has already, by most independent assessments, reached escape velocity. The asymmetry is telling. One leader is shopping for wins to take home to voters ahead of bruising midterm elections. The other is managing a civilisational project measured in decades. Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it with characteristic precision in CNBC on the day the summit opened: “China comes into this meeting far more confident than in 2017, when it feared even a small rise in US tariffs. In the last year, Xi has been able to push back and neutralise much of Trump’s actions.” 2017 v 2026: Change in Body Language? Central to China’s structural advantage is its commanding position in the global shipping and logistics system – a dominance so comprehensive that it shapes the price of practically everything that moves by sea. By mid-2024, China had invested in ports in 16 of the top 20 nations for shipping connectivity. Roughly 27 per cent of global container trade now passes through terminals partly or wholly owned by Chinese or Hong Kong-based companies. In 2024 alone, China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder produced more commercial tonnage than the entire United States shipbuilding industry has delivered since the Second World War. Shanghai handled 51.5 million TEUs in 2024, making it the world’s busiest port – five times the throughput of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined. When China flexes its position in containerised freight, it is not merely adjusting a commercial variable. It is moving a lever that governs global commodity pricing across industries from automotive parts to pharmaceuticals, from agricultural produce to consumer electronics. The United States, which conducts the overwhelming majority of its trade by sea, sits downstream of that lever. Underpinning this logistical supremacy is a strategic energy architecture that took shape long before Trump’s tariff wars began. China’s early and consistent investment in Iranian crude – formalised in the 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement whose foundations Xi Jinping himself proposed during a 2016 visit to Tehran – secured access to oil trading at an $8–10 discount per barrel below global benchmarks. While Western economies lurched from one energy shock to the next, buffeted by sanctions regimes and geopolitical crises they themselves often authored, Beijing was buying Iranian crude at predictable, heavily discounted rates through independent refiners insulated from direct sanction exposure. More broadly, Xi’s decade-long programme of energy self-sufficiency – wind, solar, hydropower, domestic drilling and diversified import partnerships – has positioned China to weather disruptions that send other economies into crisis. The current US-Israel war against Iran, which has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and sent global energy prices spiralling, is a case in point. China’s energy fortress, as analysts at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy have noted, appears to be passing its sternest test. That cannot be said of the United States. Yangshan: The world’s busiest container port handling more than 50 million TEUs annually The technological transformation is perhaps the most significant shift of all. China is no longer, in any meaningful sense, the cheap-labour assembly floor of the global economy. Its “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy has delivered on its core promises with a thoroughness that has alarmed Western analysts. China now leads the world in industrial robotics installations, dominates the clean technology supply chain from lithium batteries to solar panels, and – with DeepSeek’s R1 model launching in early 2025 to international astonishment – has demonstrated serious, applied artificial intelligence capability that challenges American primacy in what was supposed to be a US-led domain. In rare earths, which sit at the chokepoint of every advanced technology from fighter jets to electric vehicles to AI semiconductors, Beijing controls 85–90 per cent of […]
Final day of ChinaPlas 2026 in Shanghai — and what an exceptional week it’s been
24 April 2026 A hugely successful event for Gapuma Group Limited. Our team has made extensive new connections, strengthened existing relationships, and laid the foundations for long-term partnerships across the global plastics and rubber industry. Just as importantly, we’ve seen first-hand the innovation, expertise, and forward thinking shaping the future of our sector — a powerful reminder of the pace and potential of this market. Thank you to everyone who took the time to meet with Russell Brill, Mihael Nahmias and Kishor Ubrani (Gapuma, Ghana). We look forward to continuing the conversations.
Gapuma at ChinaPlas 2026 – See You in Shanghai
16 April 2026 We are delighted to announce that Gapuma will be represented at ChinaPlas 2026 in Shanghai next week (21-24 April), where our Purchasing Director, Russell Brill, and Head of Polymers, Mihael Nahmias, will be in attendance. ChinaPlas is one of the most significant events in the global plastics and rubber industry calendar – a unique opportunity to connect with the brightest minds in the business, explore the latest innovations shaping our industry, and strengthen the relationships that drive it forward. For those of us who believe in the power of face-to-face dialogue, there is truly no substitute. Gapuma’s presence at events such as this reflects our enduring commitment to the industry we serve – a commitment to staying at the forefront of market developments, fostering long-term partnerships, and delivering the very best for our customers and suppliers across the globe. If you or your colleagues are also attending ChinaPlas this year, we would love to connect. Please do reach out to Russell or Mihael directly – we look forward to seeing you in Shanghai.