Hormuz: Why a Lukewarm War Suits More Players Than Peace
The Strait of Hormuz – neither fully closed nor safely open 19 November 2026 The Strait of Hormuz has become the world’s most expensive stalemate. It is neither fully closed nor safely open, and the main parties seem in no hurry to resolve it. The latest flare-up shows how fragile the situation is. Two tankers were left with engine-room fires: one after an attack seven nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman, the other after being hit by an unidentified projectile as it left the strait. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Navy has warned shipping companies against the US-backed southern route, calling it fully closed. A third American aircraft carrier has arrived in the Gulf. Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliamentary speaker and chief negotiator, has left no doubt about Tehran’s position: “the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened until our seven conditions, based on the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, are met.” A narrow passage with outsized consequences for global energy and trade So who wants what – and why does a slow burn seem to suit so many of them? Tehran: leverage, rationed Hormuz is Iran’s strongest card, and it is playing it selectively. Ships from Iraq, India, China and Qatar have been exempted from its restrictions. A senior Iranian lawmaker said each exemption has its own reason: India’s to ease medicine imports into Iran, China’s to secure Beijing’s political support. Qatar pays no transit fees, while Indian and Chinese vessels still do. A partly open strait brings in revenue and allies. A fully open one would give that leverage away. Tehran’s price for reopening is high. Its plan calls for the release of frozen Iranian assets estimated at at least $12 billion, the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil, and an end to the US naval blockade of Iran. Washington: no concessions under fire President Trump rejected Iran’s proposal, and Washington continues its counter-blockade of Iranian ports. The doubts in Washington are about trust as much as terms: there is “deep suspicion” that Iran may simply be buying time to export more oil and ease its economic pain. For the United States, a deal on Tehran’s terms would look like surrender. Steady pressure, backed by carriers, looks like resolve. Beijing and New Delhi: covered, for now China and India still receive Gulf crude through Iran’s selective exemptions The big Asian buyers have their own arrangements. Of the 10.23 million barrels a day of Gulf crude that passed through the strait in October, about 42 per cent went to China and 13 per cent to India. Their oil is still getting through, so they have little reason to spend political capital pushing for a settlement. Baghdad: making do Iraq has paid heavily. Its losses from the war and disrupted oil exports have reached $60 billion. It has reached an understanding with the United States to export oil through a shipping lane near Oman, and exports rose to about 3.5 million barrels a day in October from 2.65 million in September. For Iraq, too, a workable arrangement has taken the place of a full solution. Why peace can wait This is the uncomfortable logic of the moment. Each of the main players has found a way to live with the stalemate, while a real settlement would demand public concessions that none of them can easily afford. Even the partial recovery works against urgency: Gulf crude exports reached more than 80% of pre-war levels in October, which suggests that a degraded system can still function. Those who pay are mostly elsewhere: fertiliser buyers, chemical importers and growing economies far from the Gulf. Possible paths We offer no forecast, only three broad scenarios worth watching: The simmer continues. Selective passage, periodic strikes and a fixed risk premium become the norm, and supply chains adapt around them. A negotiated reopening. A face-saving formula, perhaps built on the Islamabad framework, lets both sides claim a win. That would probably need a trigger neither currently has. Escalation. A serious miscalculation, such as an attack with heavy loss of life, could break the stalemate in the wrong direction. What this means for trade bulk carrier loading port At Gapuma, we follow Hormuz closely because no other stretch of water shows so clearly where global trade and finance are heading. For now, it suggests that volatility is no longer the exception but the operating environment. Customers and partners should plan for longer lead times, firmer freight and insurance costs, and sudden changes in sentiment. We will continue to keep them informed at every turn.
Powering the AI Boom: Why Molecules Matter as Much as Code
For all its talk of clouds and algorithms, artificial intelligence is turning out to be one of the most physical industries of the age. It needs land, steel, copper and, above all, energy. The companies building it are discovering that the public grid cannot keep up. Nowhere is this clearer than at SpaceX, which absorbed Elon Musk’s xAI earlier this year and now reports artificial intelligence as its largest revenue segment. The company is building an eight-mile pipeline, known as Starpipe, to its Texas launch site. Florida regulators have approved the tariff for a 32.4-mile line near Cape Canaveral. SpaceX has also earmarked around $2 billion for mobile gas turbines to power its data centres, and is recruiting a team to trade natural gas, both physically and financially. Its own filings show capital spending of more than $48 billion in the first nine months of 2026. On-site gas turbines are fast becoming the power source of choice for AI data centres unable to wait years for a grid connection The pressure is felt well beyond one company. In America’s largest power market, PJM, the latest capacity auction cleared at its price cap and still fell short of its reliability target, with surging data-centre demand the main driver. As PJM’s chief executive, David Mills, put it, demand for electricity “continues to grow faster than electricity supply.” The International Energy Agency expects global data-centre electricity use to almost double, from 485 terawatt-hours in 2025 to around 950 by 2030. Meeting that demand is running into hard physical limits. Lead times for gas turbines now stretch beyond 2029, while transformers, which are heavy users of copper, can reportedly take up to four years to arrive. The bottleneck is shifting from chips to equipment and materials. Transformers and copper cabling are now among the scarcest components in the AI build-out, with lead times stretching to several years. Does this mean households should expect power cuts? In Britain, not this winter. The National Energy System Operator forecasts an operational surplus of 5.9 GW, a comfortable margin over peak demand. Grid connection queues already hold around 50 GW of data-centre requests, so most new facilities must wait before they can draw power. Britain’s grid operator expects comfortable electricity margins this winter, but the long queue for new connections tells a longer-term story. The more immediate risk is to bills rather than to supply. In the PJM region, data centres accounted for 63% of one year’s capacity price rise, a cost passed on to every ratepayer. Britain’s power prices are set largely by gas, so it remains exposed through the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, which has removed around a fifth of the world’s seaborne LNG capacity. The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has removed around a fifth of the world’s seaborne LNG capacity, leaving Europe’s gas-linked power prices exposed Yet the choice between keeping the lights on and curbing AI is a false one. Oregon has created a dedicated electricity rate class for data centres, and Virginia lawmakers have proposed shifting capacity costs away from households. The IEA recommends flexible, grid-integrated operation, so that data centres can ease demand at peak times. Sited intelligently, they can absorb renewable power that would otherwise be curtailed, and their waste heat can feed local heat networks. For suppliers of physical commodities, the implications are significant. If technology companies begin drilling for their own gas, demand will rise for well-service and drilling chemicals. Turbines, cables, pipelines and cooling systems all rely on coatings, polymers and speciality chemicals. Every shift in gas demand also ripples through petrochemical feedstocks, fertilisers and fuels, markets already unsettled by events in the Gulf. Behind every gigawatt of computing power lies a physical supply chain of drilling chemicals, coatings, polymers and fuels Gapuma follows these currents closely, through its chemicals distribution across West Africa, its biofuels activity and its long-standing focus on the Strait of Hormuz as a barometer of global trade. Where grids are weakest, as in much of Africa, the self-powered model SpaceX is pioneering in Texas has long been familiar. As data-centre investment reaches cities such as Lagos, Accra and Abidjan, reliable access to materials will matter more than ever. The AI revolution will be written in code, but it will be built with molecules. Those who keep those molecules moving through scarcity, volatility and geopolitical shock will help determine how quickly it arrives.
What Turkey’s Polymer Shortfall Teaches Import-Dependent Markets
PETKIM remains Turkey’s first and only integrated petrochemical company By: Phume Mazibuko – Operations Associate 5 November 2026 When the Strait of Hormuz closed this spring, Turkish converters felt it within weeks. Between early March and early May, the price of PVC delivered to Turkey rose from $840 to $1,190 a tonne – an increase of more than 40% – and six months on, supply remains tight. The shock laid bare a weakness that S&P Global Commodity Insights examines in its September report on the Turkish market. Turkey is one of the great manufacturing hubs between Europe and Asia, supplying packaging, textiles, white goods and car parts, yet it imports most of the polymer its factories consume. For a distributor such as Gapuma, the distance between what Turkey makes and what it uses is where the commercial story lies – in supply risk, in pricing and in opportunity. Turkey is now moving to close that distance. On 27 October, Univation Technologies announced that Petkim, SOCAR’s Turkish petrochemical arm, had chosen its UNIPOL process for a planned 850,000-tonne-a-year polyethylene complex at Aliağa – one of the largest PE technology licences ever awarded in Turkey. Univation’s president, Sereen Massoud, said the project “would support PETKIM’s long-term growth while expanding domestic supply.” A second milestone falls on 30 November, when Turkey’s deadline for recycled plastics in food-contact packaging takes effect. Together, the two developments show a country tackling its shortfall from both ends: building new capacity, and making better use of the material it already has. A Manufacturing Hub Reliant on Imports S&P’s analysts describe Turkey as structurally short of polyethylene (PE), polypropylene (PP), PVC and ABS. For years, demand for these polymers has outgrown GDP, driven by packaging, export-focused converters and urbanisation, while domestic capacity has barely moved. The figures are stark. Turkey imported around 2.1 million tonnes of PP in 2025, making it the world’s third-largest importer, with Saudi Arabia its biggest supplier. Its sole PVC producer has 150,000 tonnes of capacity, against forecast demand this year of roughly 1.17 million tonnes. And in ABS, South Korea supplied about 60% of imports in 2025, feeding the country’s white goods and auto parts makers. Domestic supply is also highly concentrated. For PE, PP and PVC alike, Turkey relies on a single producer, Petkim, whose PP capacity stands at around 145,000 tonnes a year – less than a tenth of the PP the country imports. PET is the exception. Producers such as Sasa and Koksan have invested heavily, and Turkish demand for PET resin grew from 475,000 tonnes in 2019 to 720,000 tonnes in 2025. 2026: A Stress Test for Supply The Middle East war and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz exposed that dependence almost overnight. ICIS estimates that around 84% of Middle East PE capacity relies on the Strait for seaborne exports – precisely the supply on which Turkey leans most. Buyers rushed to secure what they could. ChemOrbis data shows that Turkey’s polymer imports hit their highest monthly level on record in April, up 21% on March. The supplier mix shifted too: Saudi ABS shipments to Turkey more than tripled between the first and second quarters, as Korean cargoes became slower and costlier to deliver. Nor has the pressure fully eased. ChemOrbis reported that Turkish PP and PE prices kept rising through September, driven by tight availability rather than costs. The lesson is a simple one: where a market depends on a single supply route and a single domestic producer, one disruption can reprice it entirely. Turkey’s Policy Response Ankara is pursuing three approaches in parallel: protection where it already has capacity, regulation to grow recycled supply, and new capacity where it is short. Protection Since 19 July, Turkey has applied a safeguard duty of $120 a tonne on PET resin imports, falling to $110 by the third year and running until December 2028. It replaced a provisional $100 duty introduced at the end of 2025, which Turkey notified to the WTO in January. Regulation In September 2025, Turkey lifted its ban on recycled plastics in food-contact packaging under an EU-aligned framework, with strict rules on decontamination and traceability. Operators have until 30 November to comply in full. With multinational beverage brands already working towards EU-style recycled-content targets, the number of recyclers ready by the deadline will shape the supply of food-grade R-PET in 2027. New capacity Three projects stand out: Project Product Capacity Latest status Petkim Master Plan (SOCAR) Ethylene, PE, PP New PE complex of 850,000 t/yr; PP from 145,000 to 550,000 t/yr PE technology chosen 27 October 2026; FEED under way with Technip Energies; investment decision pending Ceyhan PP (Rönesans, Sonatrach) PP 472,500 t/yr Slipped from April 2026 to 2027 Sasa PDH Propylene 1 million t/yr Scheduled 2026/27, per S&P Petkim’s master plan is the most significant. Engineering is already under way: in late September, Petkim awarded Technip Energies the licence for a new ethylene cracker and the front-end engineering for the wider complex. Petkim says the plan could cut Turkey’s PE import bill by about $1.5 billion a year. The open question is timing. Fitch still expects SOCAR to take the final investment decision by the end of 2026; Petkim’s own latest investor presentation points to 2027, once engineering is complete. Either way, a positive decision would be the clearest signal yet that Turkey means to close its polymer gap. Even then, relief will be gradual. Rönesans says its Ceyhan plant alone would meet roughly 17% of Turkey’s PP demand, but the project has slipped to 2027, and none of the new capacity will arrive quickly. Turkey will remain import-dependent for years. Nigeria: A Case Study in Import Substitution Nigeria tells a different story. Until recently, according to the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN), the country imported about 90% of its PP – roughly 250,000 tonnes a year. That changed in March 2025, when the Dangote refinery’s PP plant came on stream. With 830,000 tonnes of annual capacity, it is Africa’s largest, and Aliko […]
E100 Gets a Second Home
By: Phume Mazibuko, Operations Associate 3 November 2026 For almost half a century, one country has had the pure-ethanol car to itself. Brazil built an entire motoring culture around fuel distilled from sugarcane, while the rest of the world treated ethanol as something to stir into petrol in modest quantities. Last week, that changed. India, the world’s third-largest car market, wrote E100 into its vehicle rules. The pioneer finally has company, and the latest arrival is a very large one. On 23 October, India’s Ministry of Road Transport and Highways amended the Central Motor Vehicles Rules to recognise E100 – fuel that is almost entirely ethanol – for certified flex-fuel vehicles. The notification, G.S.R. 911(E), appeared in the official gazette on 26 October and adds E100 alongside E85 in the emission and testing standards. It follows a draft published for consultation in April. The wording is deliberately narrow. High-ethanol fuels “shall be used in the vehicles designed by the original equipment manufacturers” as flex-fuel vehicles. For India’s existing motorists, nothing changes. Cars built for today’s E20 petrol cannot simply switch to pure ethanol, and owners are not being asked to convert anything. What has changed is that carmakers now have a clear route to certify flex-fuel models for sale. Some are already on the move. Maruti Suzuki launched the Wagon R Flex Fuel, which can run on anything from E20 to E100, in June. Toyota, Tata Motors and Hyundai are developing their own. Road transport minister Nitin Gadkari, who has championed ethanol for years, has suggested an all-ethanol car could bring fuel costs down to around Rs 25 a litre. What the notification does not do is set a date for E100 to reach the forecourt. Maruti Suzuki’s Wagon R Flex Fuel – India’s first flex-fuel passenger car India does not have to look far for a template. Brazil launched its national ethanol programme in 1976, in the aftermath of the first oil shock, and spent the next three decades building the distilleries and distribution network to support it. The decisive moment came in 2004, with the arrival of flex-fuel cars that let drivers choose petrol, pure ethanol or any blend of the two at the pump. Today flex-fuel vehicles account for more than 85% of new light vehicle sales in Brazil and over 80% of the fleet, and pure hydrous ethanol is sold at almost every filling station. The pioneer has not stood still. On 14 July, Brazil’s National Energy Policy Council raised the mandatory ethanol content of ordinary petrol from 30% to 32% for 180 days, citing volatility in global oil markets. The move has been challenged in the courts by federal prosecutors, who argue that the testing behind it was designed for E30. The Ministry of Mines and Energy is unmoved, insisting that E32 is technically viable and safe for vehicles. Brazil also shows the limits of the model. Its flex-fuel drivers are ruthlessly practical: they buy whichever fuel is cheaper. In February, only around a quarter of them were filling up with pure ethanol. Sugarcane harvest in São Paulo state, the heartland of Brazilian ethanol The timing is no coincidence. With the Strait of Hormuz still largely closed and crude prices volatile, governments everywhere are taking a harder look at fuel they can grow at home. Brazil cited exactly that volatility when it moved to E32. In India, officials have been explicit that flex-fuel vehicles reduce the country’s exposure to fossil-fuel import risks – no small matter for a nation that imports most of its oil. Others are moving too, although most are adjusting blends rather than embracing pure ethanol. The US House of Representatives passed a bill in May to allow E15 to be sold year-round, though it still awaits the Senate. Paraguay already runs E30 as standard, and Thailand sells E20 and E85 alongside its mandatory E10. Indonesia plans to introduce E10 from 2027 and move towards E20, although supply constraints have already pushed its timetable back once. Japan is taking a more measured path, targeting E10 by 2030 and E20 by 2040. Europe remains the outlier, capping crop-based ethanol at around 7% of transport energy. The picture, then, is one of a broad shift towards ethanol, with Brazil out in front and India now positioned to become the second country where pure ethanol is an everyday pump fuel. For Gapuma, this is not a distant policy story. Biofuels and ethanol are one of our core sectors: we source fuel-grade, industrial and extra neutral alcohol from leading distilleries and deliver it to blenders, distributors and oil companies, in anything from drums to full vessel cargoes. We have worked with Indian ethanol for well over a decade, supporting the movement of product from Indian distilleries into the Middle East and Africa, and our sourcing is ISCC certified. India’s decision matters to us in two ways. First, it signals rising domestic demand for ethanol in one of the world’s most important producing countries, which will shape availability and pricing for everyone who buys from it. Second, it reinforces a trend we see across our markets, from West Africa to South America: governments treating home-grown fuel as a matter of energy security rather than simply an environmental gesture. Supply chains built around ethanol will need reliable sourcing, careful quality control and the logistics to move product where it is needed. That is the work we do every day. Brazil’s experience suggests that three things will decide whether India follows it all the way. The cars need to arrive in volume, and India’s first flex-fuel passenger car only went on sale in June. Ethanol needs to stay cheaper than petrol at the pump, because drivers will not pay a premium for principle. And distillery capacity has to keep pace, or India risks exchanging imported oil for imported ethanol. Brazil took almost three decades to move from its first ethanol programme to a flex-fuel fleet. India has put its legal framework in place six months after publishing the […]
Europe Faces Winter With Gas at a Four-Year High and Storage at a Record Low
27 October 2026 Europe’s benchmark gas price has climbed to its highest level in four years, just as the continent enters the heating season with less gas in storage, for the time of year, than at any point in the records kept by Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE). On Monday the front-month contract at the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) rose above €95 per megawatt-hour, extending a weekly gain of around 7%, as several EU member states began drawing on their reserves ahead of the cold months. The cause is not hard to find. More than seven months after the Iran war all but closed the Strait of Hormuz, liquefied natural gas from the Persian Gulf has yet to return in any meaningful volume. Roughly a fifth of global LNG trade ordinarily passes through the strait. Qatar was the world’s second-largest exporter before the conflict, and its shipments have slowed to a trickle since Iranian missiles struck its giant Ras Laffan complex in the spring. A Qatari – Q-Max Tanker GIE, which represents Europe’s storage and terminal operators, has been blunt about the consequences. Its Secretary General, Lucie Boost, warned this month that Europe is heading into winter “with less gas in storage and less room for error”. The figures bear her out. EU storage sites were 74.6% full on 25 October, well below the five-year seasonal average and around eight percentage points lower than a year ago. By GIE’s own reckoning, Europe began October with roughly 811 TWh of gas underground, against some 940 TWh twelve months earlier. Gas storage tanks Europe That shortfall has set Europe against Asia in a fierce contest for spot cargoes. American exports have risen to their highest level since June. In a telling reversal, QatarEnergy itself has agreed to buy LNG from Cheniere Energy in the United States under a long-term contract, as damage to its own facilities continues to disrupt deliveries. There are tentative signs of movement: more Qatari carriers have been crossing Hormuz in recent days, some loading without broadcasting their positions. So far, though, nothing amounts to relief. The consequences reach well beyond household heating bills. Natural gas is both the fuel and, in many cases, the raw material of modern chemistry. It underpins ammonia, fertilisers, methanol and a long chain of downstream products. Europe’s chemical makers were already contending with high costs and weak demand before the latest rally. Credit insurer Atradius has forecast that German chemical output will contract by 4.7% this year, citing the Gulf war’s effect on feedstock and energy prices. Germany’s chemical industry association has described an industry under constant stress. Every additional euro on the TTF price feeds through into the cost of coatings, additives and speciality ingredients further along the supply chain. There is, however, another side to the ledger. Africa’s Atlantic producers have stepped into part of the gap left by the Gulf. African LNG exports rose by 27% year on year in the first quarter of 2026, to 11.32 million tonnes. Nigeria led the way on 4.99 million tonnes, a rise of 45%. European buyers have turned increasingly to cargoes from Nigeria, Algeria and Angola, which reach their terminals faster and without passing through a single contested chokepoint. A tanker discharging at Bonny Island – Nigeria’s LNG hub For Gapuma, whose interests span Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola and South Africa, that shift is significant. The Gulf of Guinea and the wider Atlantic seaboard are gaining strategic weight as Europe seeks dependable supply closer to home. With that comes fresh investment, new trade routes and growing demand for the chemicals and services that keep energy infrastructure running. We have long regarded the Strait of Hormuz as a barometer for the direction of global trade and finance. This week’s price movement confirms that its effects are no longer confined to oil or to the Gulf itself. They are now being felt in European storage caverns, on factory floors and in the shipping lanes off West Africa. With storage thin and Gulf cargoes absent, the weather will decide much of what follows. A mild winter may see Europe through with little more than expensive gas. A hard one would test the system in earnest, and every day without LNG transiting Hormuz adds to that risk.
Diesel, Not Crude, Is the Barrel to Watch This Winter
Each attack on Red Sea shipping now ripples through global fuel markets 23 October 2026 Every energy shock has its headline number, and this one is no exception. Brent crude traded at around $114 a barrel on Friday, heading for a third straight weekly gain after Yemen’s Houthis claimed fresh strikes on Saudi Arabia, including the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Since Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Yanbu has become the kingdom’s principal exit for oil, which is why each attack there sends a shiver through the market. Yet the price on the trading screens tells only half the story. The real strain sits further along the chain, in the fuel that does the heavy lifting. The middle of the barrel Diesel – or gasoil, as the trade knows it – is the least glamorous product a refinery makes and arguably the most important. It powers lorries, freight trains, ships, combine harvesters and mining equipment. Across much of Africa it also runs the generators that bridge the gap when the grid falls short. When diesel tightens, the cost of moving and making almost everything rises with it. Diesel does the heavy lifting – and when it tightens, everything costs more to move And diesel has tightened dramatically. The International Energy Agency’s October Oil Market Report, published on 14 October, warns that diesel and gasoil markets will remain under pressure into 2027. Even if refineries raise runs quickly before the year is out, the agency expects output to fall short of consumption in the fourth quarter, leaving little prospect of inventories recovering before the second half of next year. The numbers are stark. Global diesel exports in September were 700,000 barrels a day lower than a year earlier. Diesel refining margins – the premium the fuel commands over the crude from which it is distilled – climbed to record highs approaching $100 a barrel in September. At the pump, the average American motorist is paying more than $6 a gallon for diesel, roughly three-quarters more than a year ago, while EU averages have set records above €2.20 a litre. US diesel is above $6 a gallon; EU averages have set records above €2.20 a litre A refining problem, not an oil problem The shortfall lies in refining capacity, not in oil coming out of the ground The striking feature of this crisis is that crude and diesel have parted company. Middle Eastern crude exports have been recovering, yet product markets remain tight, because the shortfall lies in refining capacity damaged or disrupted by conflict rather than in oil coming out of the ground. More barrels of crude do not, on their own, make more diesel. Governments have noticed. On 2 October the G7 agreed to accelerate emergency stock releases under the IEA’s collective action programme, giving diesel priority. Some 331 million barrels had been drawn from emergency stocks by the end of September – a cushion that grows thinner with every release. High prices are already doing their own work. The IEA expects world oil demand to fall by 2.6 million barrels a day this year, with diesel accounting for about a quarter of that decline. Demand destruction of that scale is less a cure than a symptom: it is the sound of economic activity being quietly rationed by price. What it means for West Africa For Gapuma’s core markets, the picture is nuanced. West Africa has long depended on imported diesel, much of it supplied from Russia and India, alongside cargoes from Europe and the Gulf. As the war in the Middle East squeezed those traditional routes, Nigeria’s Dangote refinery stepped up its exports across the continent, with cargoes sold to buyers serving markets including Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Regional refining capacity, once an aspiration, is now a genuine source of resilience. That does not insulate the region from global prices, which still set the benchmark. But it does shorten supply lines at a moment when distance has become expensive and unpredictable. Reading the signals For businesses that trade, transport or manufacture, three questions deserve attention over the coming months. First, how exposed are freight and logistics costs to diesel, and can contracts absorb further volatility? Second, how robust are supply routes if Red Sea disruption intensifies? Third, which customers – in agriculture, mining, construction and manufacturing – will feel the squeeze first, and how will that alter demand? Crude will keep the headlines. Diesel will decide the margins. This winter, the wise money is watching the middle of the barrel.
Salt of the Earth: Why We Are Building a Calcium Chloride Plant in Egypt
20 October 2026 By: Tamer Zaidan, Chief Executive Officer, Gapuma Life Chimie Few people outside our industry give calcium chloride a second thought. Yet most of us rely on it every week without knowing it. It keeps winter roads open and safe, holds down dust on unpaved surfaces, helps concrete cure on a cold morning and firms the curd in cheese-making. Deep beneath the seabed, it helps keep oil and gas wells safe and under control. When we recently shared a first look at Gapuma Life Chimie, the joint venture between Gapuma Holdings and Life Chemicals Group, the response was generous and the questions were good ones. Why calcium chloride? Why Egypt? Why now? This article is my attempt to answer them. A Deceptively Simple Salt Chemically, calcium chloride is a straightforward salt of calcium and chlorine. Commercially, it is remarkable for three properties. It draws moisture from the air with unusual eagerness. It gives off heat as it dissolves. In solution, it lowers the freezing point of water and raises its density. Each of those properties opens a market. The Market Today Analysts differ on the precise figures, as they usually do, but they agree on the shape of the market. Recent estimates value global calcium chloride demand at between US$1.4 billion and US$2.2 billion in 2025, with growth forecast at roughly 4.5 to 6 per cent a year over the coming decade. One application stands above all others: de-icing and dust control, which together account for around two-fifths of global demand. Clearing the Way Every winter, road authorities across Europe, North America and other cold-climate regions face the same challenge: keeping highways, airports and pavements open when temperatures fall. Calcium chloride is one of the most effective tools they have. Its advantage lies in those three properties working together. Because it attracts moisture, it begins forming a brine almost as soon as it touches ice. Because it releases heat as it dissolves, it gets to work quickly. And because its brine freezes at such a low temperature, it keeps melting ice down to around −32°C. Ordinary rock salt loses its effectiveness at much milder temperatures, somewhere between −4°C and −18°C depending on conditions. When the cold is at its hardest, calcium chloride is often the product that keeps traffic moving. It is used on its own, blended with rock salt to boost performance, or sprayed as a liquid brine to treat roads before snow arrives. That makes de-icing salt a cornerstone of our plant’s commercial strategy. Europe in particular is a natural market for us: it already sources a significant share of its calcium chloride from outside the bloc, and Egypt is among its leading suppliers. Our granulated product is designed with that market firmly in mind. Beyond the Road De-icing is far from the whole story. In the oilfield, calcium chloride brine is one of the most economical clear fluids used in well completion and workover operations. It reaches a density of about 11.6 pounds per gallon, around 1.6 pounds per gallon more than sodium chloride brine, and can be blended with calcium bromide to go higher still. With Africa expected to host around 40 per cent of the world’s high-impact exploration wells this year, that demand is close to home. Calcium chloride also accelerates the setting of concrete, stabilises soil, controls dust on haul roads and sites, and serves the food, water treatment and industrial sectors. That breadth of demand gives a producer resilience: when one market is quiet, another is usually busy. The Process Why Egypt? Egypt already has a strong record in calcium chloride. In 2023 it was the world’s fourth-largest exporter of the product by value, behind China, the United States and the Netherlands, and it is the second-largest supplier to the European Union from outside the bloc. That record rests on solid foundations, beginning with raw materials. Calcium chloride is made from two main inputs, and Egypt has a competitive advantage in both. Hydrochloric acid (HCl) is available as a by-product of certain industrial processes, including some associated with the fertiliser industry. Egypt’s well-established industrial and fertiliser sectors offer potential sources of this raw material. Calcium carbonate (CaCO₃) is found in abundant deposits of high purity across Egypt, a significant advantage for local manufacturing. Geography does the rest. From the Suez Canal and Egypt’s Mediterranean ports, product can reach southern and northern Europe, the Gulf, East Africa and West Africa with comparatively short transit times. Then there is partnership. Life Chemicals Group has been part of the Egyptian chemicals market since 1992. It operates a 40,400 sq m warehouse and offices in Cairo and Alexandria, and has recently opened a branch in Casablanca. Gapuma brings more than 25 years of international trading, a global logistics network and an established customer base across Africa and beyond. One partner knows how to make and move product in Egypt; the other knows where the world needs it. The combination of raw material availability established industrial capability, strategic location and the right partnership makes Egypt an attractive base for calcium chloride production and export. It is the reason this plant exists. The Plant Manufacturing in the Suez Free Zone The plant occupies a 10,000 sq m site in the Suez Free Zone. At its heart is the main production hall. Around it stand approximately 11 corrosion-resistant tanks for chemical reactions and raw material storage, together with a gas scrubbing system and stack designed to capture and treat process gases before release. The process is elegant in its simplicity. Hydrochloric acid reacts with calcium carbonate to produce a 37 per cent liquid calcium chloride solution. That solution then passes through the granulation unit, where it is transformed into granulated calcium chloride with a minimum concentration of 94 per cent, the form most widely traded internationally and the one best suited to de-icing markets. The Shape of Things to Come We will begin with a capacity of 30,000 tonnes a year and plan to increase this to […]
Gold, the Fed and the Limits of the Lever
7 Oct 2026 Gold has lost roughly a quarter of its value since January, in the middle of a war. The explanation lies less in the Gulf than in Washington – and in a lesson first taught in 1979. A haven that stopped behaving like one Gold is supposed to rise as the world grows more dangerous. On the 221st day of the conflict between the United States and Iran, it is doing the opposite. Having touched a record of around $5,600 an ounce in late January, the metal now trades near $4,180 – roughly a quarter lower – and at the end of September it fell to a seven-week low. Writing for Investing.com this week, the analyst Satendra Singh reaches for the obvious parallel: the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and the 444 days that followed. The comparison is instructive, though not quite for the reason usually given. The crisis of 1979 was a hostage standoff, not a war. Gold surged regardless, reaching $850 an ounce on 21 January 1980. Then it fell away, and went on falling. Diplomacy did not break the rally – the hostages remained in captivity for a further year. The price of money did. The price of money On 6 October 1979 – forty-seven years ago this week – Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve abandoned gradualism. It set out to control the supply of money directly and let interest rates find their own level. They found it near 20 per cent. In March 1980 President Carter added credit controls of his own, which deepened a downturn and were dismantled within months. Inflation eventually broke. So did gold. The mechanism at work today is the same one, in a lower key. The war disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and carried Brent crude from around $73 a barrel to $118 by late April. US consumer price inflation reached 4.2 per cent in May, with energy the principal cause. The Federal Reserve, now chaired by Kevin Warsh, responded in September by raising rates to a range of 3.75–4.00 per cent. The vote was unanimous, and 16 of its 18 policymakers expect at least one further rise before the year is out. The next decision falls on 27–28 October. Gold pays no interest. When cash and bonds pay more, and the dollar firms, the cost of holding it rises. The conflict, in other words, is weighing on gold by way of inflation: the market is trading the central bank’s response to the war rather than the war itself. Whose hand is on the lever? It is tempting to speak of a president reviving a Carter-era playbook. The phrase assumes that the playbook is his to open. For the most part, it is not. Fiscal policy belongs largely to Congress, and a federal deficit in the region of 6 per cent of GDP leaves little room for manoeuvre in any case. What remains to the White House is persuasion, appointment and pressure – real influences, but not controls. Monetary policy belongs to the Federal Reserve. President Trump has argued that rates should stand at 1 per cent or lower; the chairman he chose has raised them. The echo of 1979 is exact in one respect only: Carter appointed Volcker, and it was Volcker’s medicine, not Carter’s, that the economy swallowed. The one lever that is unmistakably the President’s is the war. At a rally in Nebraska on Monday he described higher prices as “a small price to pay” and said the conflict would be over very soon. If that proves right, the reopening of Hormuz would do more to lower inflation, and with it interest rates, than any instruction to the central bank. That is a matter of diplomacy, not macroeconomic management. What it means For commodity traders. Dollar funding is becoming dearer at the very moment that energy, freight and feedstock prices remain volatile. Working capital costs more, and a firm dollar bears down on buyers in import-dependent markets, not least across West and Southern Africa. In such conditions the tenor of financing, the depth of counterparty relationships and the discipline of hedging count for more than any directional view. Hormuz remains the barometer. For investors. Gold is not a hedge against bad news as such. It protects against falling real yields and a weakening currency; it offers little shelter from a central bank intent on restoring both. Those who bought at the peak in 1980 waited nearly three decades to see that price again. The difference today is that central banks themselves remain steady buyers, which lends the metal a support it lacked then. For savers. Higher rates are, at last, a headline in their favour. The figure that matters, however, is the real return. A deposit paying 4 per cent while prices rise by 4 per cent is merely standing still. The lesson of 1979 is not that history repeats. It is that the crisis was brought to an end by a central banker in Washington and by negotiators in Algiers. Neither was pulling a presidential lever. This article is commentary and does not constitute investment advice.
Clariant Brings Its Laboratories Closer to the Customer in China
6 October 2026 Chemistry travels well, but innovation is better done close to home. That is the thinking behind Clariant’s decision to open two new research and development laboratories for its Additives business in China, announced on 18 August. The first sits at Daya Bay in Huizhou, beside the company’s flame retardants plant. That plant was inaugurated in 2023 and gained a second production line last November, taking total investment in the site to CHF 100 million. The new laboratory will develop the next generation of flame retardants and is designed to welcome collaboration with Chinese universities and innovation partners. The second is in Shanghai, within the additives technology centre at the One Clariant Campus. Its field is performance additives – antioxidants, light stabilisers and waxes – and its facilities run from synthesis and analytics through to pilot-scale production. Taken together, the two represent a change of kind. Clariant already developed applications locally; it can now create new additives in China from first research to pilot scale. The materials in question serve some of the fastest-moving industries anywhere, among them e-mobility, electronics, artificial intelligence and packaging – sectors in which a few months gained in development can decide who leads. The laboratories also complete a picture that has been taking shape for some time. Last November Clariant announced a joint venture with Fuhua on phosphorus-based flame retardants, and opened a second line at its Cangzhou plant, run jointly with Beijing Tiangang, to serve China’s nylon industry. Research, manufacturing and partnership now sit side by side in the same market. The company calls the approach “In China, For China”, and for its customers the result is practical: shorter lead times, quicker technical support and products designed around their own requirements. Manuel Mueller, Head of Strategy and Innovation for the Adsorbents & Additives business unit, put the ambition plainly: to strengthen Clariant’s standing as the “partner of choice for innovative and sustainable additive solutions”. It is a phrase that will ring true to anyone who works with the company. Gapuma’s own partnership with Clariant lies in a different field – Well Service Additives, across Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire – but the qualities on show in Huizhou and Shanghai are the ones we have come to know: patience, investment and a readiness to stand close to the customer. We congratulate our partner on a significant milestone.
The Atlantic Turn: Africa’s New Trade Corridors
The Port of Lobito, Angola – the Atlantic terminus of a 1,300 km rail corridor from the Copperbelt By: Shahab Mossavat 2 October 2026 For decades, the copper of Central Africa has gone to sea the long way round. Mined in the south of the Democratic Republic of Congo and in northern Zambia, it has travelled by lorry east to Dar es Salaam or south to Durban, across several borders and over journeys of around a month. The Atlantic was, to all practical purposes, out of reach. That is no longer so. The Lobito Corridor – some 1,300 km of railway from the Copperbelt to the Angolan port of Lobito, along the line of the old Benguela railway – is carrying freight again. The first trial consignment of Congolese copper concentrate reached the coast in eight days. Operated under concession by a consortium of Trafigura, Mota-Engil and Vecturis, and backed by the European Union and the United States, it is among the most closely watched infrastructure projects on the continent. More than a mineral line It would be easy to read this as a mining story. The more interesting question is what travels the other way. A railway that takes copper out can bring goods in: fertilisers, industrial chemicals, coatings raw materials, water treatment polymers and grain. These are the inputs on which farms and factories depend, and they can now reach inland markets faster and at a lower landed cost. Predictability matters as much as speed. A manufacturer who can rely on a delivery date holds less stock, ties up less capital and can plan production with confidence. That is how a mineral route becomes an economy. The governments concerned are insistent on the point. As Prime Minister Judith Suminwa Tuluka of the Democratic Republic of Congo has said: “The Lobito Corridor must not be just an infrastructure project, but a real lever for economic transformation serving the people.” The real prize is inbound – the industrial and agricultural inputs that reach inland markets The money is beginning to follow the argument. In August, the African Development Bank approved a $255 million loan and a $10 million grant for Zambia’s part in the corridor, including a new railway of about 500 km to join the Angolan line. The financing is tied to trade facilitation, agriculture and energy as well as to transport. One coast, many doors Nor is Lobito alone. Far to the north-west, five West African states – Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria – have agreed by treaty to build a six-lane highway of more than 1,000 km from Abidjan to Lagos, and to run it as a single supranational asset under its own authority. Costed at some $15 billion, the project has moved from technical studies to the investment stage. Taken together, these projects describe something larger than any one route. The Atlantic seaboard – from Abidjan round the Gulf of Guinea to Luanda and Lobito, and on past Walvis Bay to the Cape – is starting to behave less like a string of separate ports and more like a connected system. This is the coast on which Gapuma works. We deliver across 30 African nations, with a presence in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. For more than a quarter of a century we have learned that each coastal state is also a door: to its neighbours, and to the landlocked markets behind them. As the corridors mature, those doors open wider. The hard part None of this is guaranteed. The Lobito line still carries a small fraction of what its backers project for 2030. The Zambian link is only now being financed, and the Abidjan–Lagos highway has yet to break ground. New track does nothing to speed a slow customs post, and Africa’s earlier mineral railways enriched their ports while bypassing the people along the route. But the direction is set, and the opportunity is plain. The advantage will go to those who already know the ports, the paperwork and the people, and who can turn a faster route into a dependable supply. The copper will find its way to the sea regardless. The test of this new geography is what comes back up the line. Two corridors, one coast: the Atlantic seaboard from Abidjan to Cape Town.
The Lights Go Out in Hull: How Energy Costs Are Redrawing the Chemical Map
23 September 2026 There is a particular silence to a mothballed chemical plant. The flares die and the pipework cools, and a site built to run without pause for decades simply stops. This week, that silence descended on Saltend, on the north bank of the Humber, where Ineos began idling its three acetyls plants. Two have already ceased production and the third will follow within days. They will remain idle until further notice. What makes the moment significant is not only what these plants make but what they were. According to Ineos, they are the last world-scale acetyls units left in Europe. Every other producer on the continent has already closed, and each closure was blamed on the same thing: energy costs that could not be competed with. A problem of physics as much as price The chemistry explains the vulnerability. At Saltend, natural gas is both the energy that drives the process and the feedstock from which acetic acid, acetic anhydride and ethyl acetate are made. When gas prices rise, the whole operation becomes uneconomic, however modern the equipment or efficient the process. Prices have risen sharply. Wholesale gas in Britain and Europe has almost doubled since July, as disruption to oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz has rippled through global energy markets. “I’m sure people will find it hard to believe that we are being forced to mothball some of the most efficient plants in Europe but with gas prices now 12 times the level in the US and 8 times that of China, we just cannot compete,” said Sir Jim Ratcliffe, founder and chairman of Ineos. That 12-to-one ratio is Ineos’s own calculation. Independent market data put the gap between British and American gas nearer eight to ten times, depending on the hub and contract measured. On any measure, it is a chasm that no operational excellence can bridge. Part of a pattern, not an isolated event Hull is not an outlier. Yara mothballed its ammonia plant on the same Saltend site in early 2025. Ineos closed Britain’s last synthetic ethanol plant at Grangemouth. The acetyls business itself cut a fifth of its workforce last year. Each decision on its own might be read as a single company’s commercial choice. Taken together, they describe a structural shift: gas-based chemical production is leaving Europe. Ineos has not closed the door entirely. It is reportedly exploring direct purchases of American liquefied natural gas, a process that could take up to a year, and could restart if prices ease. It is also calling on the UK and EU to impose tariffs on Chinese imports. For now, however, a region that consumes these chemicals in large volumes no longer makes them at scale. Where the molecules go next Acetyls are rarely headline news, but they are everywhere. Acetic acid feeds coatings, adhesives and food production. Acetic anhydride is essential to pharmaceuticals, aspirin among them. Ethyl acetate is a workhorse solvent in printing inks, laminating adhesives and flexible packaging. The European manufacturers who depended on Hull have not stopped needing these materials. They have simply started looking elsewhere, to the United States, China, the Middle East and Asia more widely. That search has consequences well beyond Europe. When one major region turns to the global market in a hurry, cargoes are redirected, prices firm and lead times lengthen, including in markets that never bought from Hull. If tariffs are imposed, Chinese product shut out of Europe will seek homes elsewhere, including across Africa and Latin America. There is also a regulatory dimension. Acetic anhydride is a controlled drug precursor, so replacing supply from new origins requires rigorous licensing and end-user checks. “What happened in Hull this week will be felt far beyond Humberside,” said Russell Brill, Director of Purchasing at Gapuma Group. “When a region loses its last major source of a basic chemical, buyers do not stop needing it; they go looking elsewhere, and they all go looking at once. Our job is to make sure our customers are not caught in that rush: to know every credible origin, to secure volumes early and to be straight with people about where prices are heading.” The barometer moves At Gapuma, we have long treated the Strait of Hormuz as a barometer for the direction of global trade and finance. Most of the time, its readings show up in freight rates and insurance premiums. This week, the reading appeared somewhere far less expected: in a quiet chemical park in East Yorkshire. The lesson is uncomfortable but clear. Where chemistry gets made is increasingly decided by the price of energy, and that price is increasingly decided by geopolitics. As regional production gives way to longer, multi-origin supply chains, the distributor’s role changes. It is no longer simply a middleman. It is a shock absorber, a navigator and, at times, the difference between a production line that runs and one that stops. Hull’s plants may yet restart. Until they do, the gap they leave will be filled by those who saw it coming.