Biofuels: Where Policy Writes the Market
5 June 2026 A report by Transport & Environment (T&E), the Brussels-based clean transport campaign group, featured this week in Le Monde, projects that global biofuel demand could rise by 30% in 2026 and as much as 70% by 2030, well above earlier forecasts of 40%. The drivers are familiar to anyone watching energy markets closely. Amid instability in the Middle East and rising fossil fuel prices, countries with strong agricultural sectors are lifting their blending mandates. Indonesia is raising the palm oil content of its biodiesel to 50% from July; India, Malaysia, Brazil and the United States have all revised their targets upward. It is a moment that rewards a steady hand and genuine market literacy. As Gapuma’s own biofuels trader Charles Percheron told Le Monde: “It’s a market that wouldn’t exist without political will. Regulations can stimulate demand, but they can also curb it.” This is a market built on political will, then, where regulation can accelerate demand just as readily as it can restrain it. Reading those signals – anticipating where mandates move next, and pricing the second-generation feedstocks that may follow – is precisely the kind of judgement that defines good trading. That a national newspaper of record turned to Gapuma for that read says something about where the firm now sits in the conversation. We’re proud to see our people’s instinct and expertise recognised on the international stage. Read the full piece (In French) here: https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2026/06/04/la-ruee-vers-les-agrocarburants-un-risque-pour-la-securite-alimentaire-mondiale_6696904_3234.html
Gapuma Switzerland: At the Heart of European Biofuels
26 May 2026 Rafael Fraletti, Charles Percheron and Fabrice Brunet – Managing Director, Switzerland – recently attended the 10th European Biofuels Conference – organised by Dropet, a division of Marex – held at the Pestana Cidadela Cascais in Portugal. Now in its tenth year, the conference has established itself as a landmark gathering for buyers, sellers and companies active in the European biofuels markets. The three-day programme combined substantive keynote sessions with extensive networking. Argus Media’s Giulia Squadrin and Joshua Thomas Michalowski opened proceedings with an overview of European biofuels market trends, pricing and outlook, while Andreas Bodenmueller of Verbio examined the implications of RED III through the lens of the German experience. Beyond the formal sessions, the format allowed for the kind of frank, informal dialogue that rarely happens in a purely transactional setting – something Gapuma Group values highly as we continue to build our presence in this space. For us, conferences such as this one are not simply networking events. They are an essential part of understanding where markets are heading, and of positioning ourselves to serve our clients well. We look forward to the conversations already in progress as a result.
🛢️ GAPUMA GROUP | MARKET INTELLIGENCE | 20 MAY 2026
Hormuz, Beijing and Moscow: The Geopolitics of Oil Are Being Rewritten in Real Time The movement of two Chinese supertankers through the Strait of Hormuz today – the Yuan Gui Yang and Ocean Lily, carrying approximately 4 million barrels of crude after waiting in the Gulf for more than two months – has sent an immediate and unmistakeable signal to commodity markets. Brent crude fell to as low as $110.16 a barrel on the news. This is not merely a shipping story. It is a geopolitical statement. The vessels’ passage comes as President Trump and President Xi concluded a two-day summit in Beijing, with a White House official describing the talks as “good.” US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC that China would work behind the scenes to help reopen the strait, noting that Beijing has “a much bigger interest in reopening the strait than the US does.” Beijing, characteristically, said nothing publicly about Hormuz – Chinese state media reported only that the leaders “exchanged views on major international and regional issues, such as the Middle East situation.” Silence, in diplomacy, is often the loudest language. Iran has reportedly sought to implement a toll system for vessels crossing Hormuz – a brazen assertion of sovereign authority over an international waterway that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply. That Chinese-flagged supertankers are now moving freely while broader restrictions remain in place is a pointed reminder of where true leverage lies. Meanwhile, closer to home, Prime Minister Keir Starmer has authorised the import of Russian-refined diesel and jet fuel into the UK indefinitely, alongside a temporary licence permitting the maritime transport of Russian LNG from the Sakhalin-2 and Yamal terminals. The government frames it as pragmatism. Treasury Minister Dan Tomlinson told Sky News the government was “acting pragmatically to insulate British citizens from the economic fallout of the Middle East conflict.” Critics – not least opposition leader Kemi Badenoch – see it differently: as analysts have noted, from Moscow’s perspective, it demonstrates that Western countries are “not that committed to a sanctions regime” when their own consumers feel the pinch. The broader picture is stark. Global oil supply has declined by 12.8 mb/d in total since February, with output from Gulf countries affected by the Strait’s closure running 14.4 mb/d below pre-war levels. The IEA projects a decline of 3.9 mb/d on average across 2026, assuming flows gradually resume from June. The United Nations has already cut its global growth forecast to 2.5% this year, against an estimated 3% last year, citing higher energy costs and weaker trade. For commodities and futures desks, the key questions now are whether today’s tanker movements represent a genuine reopening or a bilateral Chinese carve-out – and whether the gap between the two matters less than markets think. Wood Mackenzie has estimated Brent could approach $200 a barrel if the Strait remains largely shut until the end of the year. The downside scenario, by contrast, assumes a rapid diplomatic resolution that supply chains are ill-prepared to absorb smoothly. At Gapuma Group, we are watching these developments closely across energy, commodities and futures markets. The rules of the game are changing – and the players setting them are not all where they used to be. For market intelligence, trading insights and strategic analysis, connect with the Gapuma Group team.
Gapuma exhibiting at WAMPEX 2026
19 May 2026 West Africa’s largest mining industry gathering takes place from 3rd to 5th June at the La Palm Royal Beach Hotel in Accra – and you will find us on the show floor. Gapuma is a premier provider of sourcing, procurement and logistics for a wide range of chemicals, solvents and other commodities, with products integral to leading industry sectors globally. In the extractives sector, that means supplying a comprehensive range of chemicals for ore processing and waste treatment, backed by strategically positioned warehouses and an efficient supply chain infrastructure to ensure timely delivery and uninterrupted production. Through our recent partnership with Servaco PPS Limited – one of West Africa’s foremost industrial and mining supply companies – we have deepened our operational roots in Ghana and across the region. Our stand at WAMPEX gives us the opportunity to build on that momentum, meeting clients, forging new partnerships and showcasing what Gapuma Ghana can deliver. Manning the stand will be Obert V J Chikwature, Bernice Boahene and Moses Gadabor. Joining them on one of the days will be Vaibhav Raj Thakkar (Senior Purchasing Manager) and Ash Unadkat (Quality and Compliance Manager) from our London office. WAMPEX brings together over 6,000 mining professionals from more than 25 countries – come and find us there. 📍 La Palm Royal Beach Hotel, Accra 📅 3rd – 5th June 2026
The Emperor Comes to Beijing — Without His Clothes
14 May 2026 By: Shahab MOSSAVAT When Donald Trump first touched down in Beijing in November 2017, Xi Jinping laid on the full theatre of imperial hospitality: a private dinner in the Forbidden City, a parade through Tiananmen Square, and the announcement of $250 billion in business deals – a figure so grand it dwarfed the entire annual GDP of West Virginia, where one of its headline memoranda of understanding was supposedly centred. Almost none of it materialised. The symbolism, however, was exquisitely chosen. China was telling the world – and telling Trump – who was truly in charge. Nine years on, the pageantry at Beijing Capital International Airport on Wednesday – the honour guard, the schoolchildren chanting in Mandarin, the skyscrapers lit with welcoming characters – carried an almost identical message, delivered with rather more pointed subtlety. Air Force One landed, and a US president who had spent his first term threatening to break China, and his second term actually trying to, stepped onto a red carpet laid by a nation that had absorbed his blows, weaponised its advantages in response, and emerged from the encounter structurally stronger. Donald Trump is greeted at Beijing airport by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng The shift in the bilateral power dynamic is not subtle. It is measurable, documented and, for Washington, deeply uncomfortable. When Trump arrived in 2017, the United States still held most of the conventional cards: it was the world’s pre-eminent consumer market, the anchor of the dollar-denominated global financial system, and the unchallenged custodian of the rules-based international order. China was formidable but still, in important respects, dependent – on American technology, American markets and American acquiescence. Trump’s instinct, brutal in its simplicity, was to exploit that dependency through tariffs. What he did not foresee was that a decade of patient strategic investment had quietly altered the underlying geometry. Consider the arithmetic of the current summit. Trump arrives in Beijing wanting concessions: market entry for American companies, Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft and US soybeans, a softening of rare earth export restrictions that brought his own industrial economy to the edge of a supply crisis. Xi, by contrast, wants stability – time to consolidate a technological and industrial position that has already, by most independent assessments, reached escape velocity. The asymmetry is telling. One leader is shopping for wins to take home to voters ahead of bruising midterm elections. The other is managing a civilisational project measured in decades. Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it with characteristic precision in CNBC on the day the summit opened: “China comes into this meeting far more confident than in 2017, when it feared even a small rise in US tariffs. In the last year, Xi has been able to push back and neutralise much of Trump’s actions.” 2017 v 2026: Change in Body Language? Central to China’s structural advantage is its commanding position in the global shipping and logistics system – a dominance so comprehensive that it shapes the price of practically everything that moves by sea. By mid-2024, China had invested in ports in 16 of the top 20 nations for shipping connectivity. Roughly 27 per cent of global container trade now passes through terminals partly or wholly owned by Chinese or Hong Kong-based companies. In 2024 alone, China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder produced more commercial tonnage than the entire United States shipbuilding industry has delivered since the Second World War. Shanghai handled 51.5 million TEUs in 2024, making it the world’s busiest port – five times the throughput of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined. When China flexes its position in containerised freight, it is not merely adjusting a commercial variable. It is moving a lever that governs global commodity pricing across industries from automotive parts to pharmaceuticals, from agricultural produce to consumer electronics. The United States, which conducts the overwhelming majority of its trade by sea, sits downstream of that lever. Underpinning this logistical supremacy is a strategic energy architecture that took shape long before Trump’s tariff wars began. China’s early and consistent investment in Iranian crude – formalised in the 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement whose foundations Xi Jinping himself proposed during a 2016 visit to Tehran – secured access to oil trading at an $8–10 discount per barrel below global benchmarks. While Western economies lurched from one energy shock to the next, buffeted by sanctions regimes and geopolitical crises they themselves often authored, Beijing was buying Iranian crude at predictable, heavily discounted rates through independent refiners insulated from direct sanction exposure. More broadly, Xi’s decade-long programme of energy self-sufficiency – wind, solar, hydropower, domestic drilling and diversified import partnerships – has positioned China to weather disruptions that send other economies into crisis. The current US-Israel war against Iran, which has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and sent global energy prices spiralling, is a case in point. China’s energy fortress, as analysts at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy have noted, appears to be passing its sternest test. That cannot be said of the United States. Yangshan: The world’s busiest container port handling more than 50 million TEUs annually The technological transformation is perhaps the most significant shift of all. China is no longer, in any meaningful sense, the cheap-labour assembly floor of the global economy. Its “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy has delivered on its core promises with a thoroughness that has alarmed Western analysts. China now leads the world in industrial robotics installations, dominates the clean technology supply chain from lithium batteries to solar panels, and – with DeepSeek’s R1 model launching in early 2025 to international astonishment – has demonstrated serious, applied artificial intelligence capability that challenges American primacy in what was supposed to be a US-led domain. In rare earths, which sit at the chokepoint of every advanced technology from fighter jets to electric vehicles to AI semiconductors, Beijing controls 85–90 per cent of […]
GLB Building Lubricants Partnerships at WAAS 2026
14 May 2026 This week, Thompson Longe, Akash Suhanda, led by Prakash Ramchandani – Managing Director of GLB Chemical Services Limited, Gapuma’s Nigerian subsidiary – attended the 2026 West Africa Automotive Show (WAAS), a three-day exhibition held in Lagos. Africa’s largest automotive aftermarket trade show, WAAS is organised by BtoB Events and held at the Landmark Centre. More than 350 exhibitors took part, with over 6,000 visitors expected from across West Africa. The show brought together importers, distributors and manufacturers showcasing products across auto parts, lubricants, tyres, batteries, heavy machinery, and mobility solutions. It has evolved into a strategic business platform for the region’s automotive sector, with networking opportunities described as unique – distributors, importers and suppliers all under one roof. Our team used the occasion to meet both overseas and local lubricants manufacturers, advancing conversations around Chevron Oronite and Chevron Base Oil business and strengthening existing relationships. Attendees included pre-vetted importers and distributors from across the region, spanning Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Cameroon and beyond. Topics on the table included opportunities in local manufacturing, spare parts distribution, lubricants and mobility solutions across West Africa. A conference running alongside the exhibition featured over 50 experts sharing insights on technology, policy and strategy. Nigeria remains a market of enormous significance. It is Africa’s largest importer of automotive spare parts, bringing in over $5 billion each year. Events like WAAS are where relationships are built and business gets done. Great to be part of it. 🤝
Is comprehensive globalism over?
What the Iran War means for physical commodity traders 24 March 2026 The Financial Times has been asking hard questions about the structural shift now under way in global business – and the conclusions demand attention from anyone in physical commodities. FT chief economics commentator Martin Wolf is unambiguous: “The worst case is that this will be one of the biggest shocks in the postwar period.” Meanwhile, FT columnist Tej Parikh cuts to a deeper vulnerability: “Investors have committed trillions of dollars to the technology, one of the most power-hungry inventions ever, on the assumption of ample energy supplies and a slick chip production line that can cross more than 70 borders before reaching the final consumer. But the Iran war is exposing the fragilities in the AI supply chain.” If that assumption of frictionless global logistics is now in doubt for the digital economy, it raises an equally sharp question for physical commodity traders: is the model of seamless, borderless trade still viable? The honest answer is: not unconditionally. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated that a single chokepoint can simultaneously disrupt energy, fertiliser, industrial gases and shipping insurance markets. Supply chains engineered for efficiency rather than resilience are being exposed for what they are. Three conclusions stand out. Hyper-globalised sourcing is a liability without redundancy built in. Global trade is not over, but it is being repriced around risk. And those with established local distribution networks are navigating this crisis measurably better than those dependent on long, centralised chains. Jack Bardakjian, Group Managing Director of Gapuma Group, is direct on this point: “Every experienced commodity trader understands that price is only half the equation – the other half is access. When the architecture of global trade is under this kind of stress, access becomes everything. Local presence, local relationships, local knowledge – these are not peripheral considerations. They are the hard infrastructure of the business.” The world will trade again. But the terms on which it does so are being rewritten. Primary source: Financial Times, 12 March 2026, and related FT reporting
The 25-Year Gamble: Who Really Wins When Corporations Build the Roads?
Rates Waived, Questions Raised By: Shahab Mossavat 18 March 2026 A £4bn gigafactory. A 25-year business rates waiver. A council that says there is nothing to worry about. The announcement that Agratas – Tata Group’s battery business, building the UK’s biggest EV gigafactory near Bridgwater in Somerset – will fund £150m of local infrastructure improvements in lieu of paying business rates for a quarter of a century is being presented as a clean swap. Somerset Council borrows nothing. Agratas builds the roads. Everyone wins. But is it really that simple? The core question is one that economic development professionals should be asking far more loudly: does a single upfront corporate investment deliver better long-term value for a local economy than a sustained, predictable stream of tax revenue? And if the answer to that is genuinely uncertain – which it is – how can anyone responsibly sign off a 25-year calculation? Business rates, for all their much-criticised rigidity, are flexible in one crucial respect: they respond to revaluations. A thriving facility pays more as its rateable value rises. Rates revenue compounds with economic success. A fixed £150m infrastructure deal, agreed today, does not. Consider the variables that no one can reliably model over 25 years: inflation, interest rates, the pace of EV adoption, Tata Group’s strategic priorities, the shifting competitive landscape for battery manufacturing, the ongoing government review of the entire business rates system. The Transforming Business Rates interim report, published as recently as September 2025, acknowledged that the system itself is under fundamental redesign. Somerset is locking in a deal built on a framework that may look very different by 2030. Council leader Bill Revans says the deal eliminates a “small amount of risk” by removing the council’s exposure to interest rate movements on a loan. That is true, as far as it goes. But it substitutes one risk for several others: the risk that £150m of roads and training provision proves inadequate as the factory scales; the risk that Agratas’s needs evolve in ways Somerset’s infrastructure cannot accommodate; the risk – and this is the one rarely discussed openly – that a corporation’s priorities change. The Government’s own infrastructure analysis is instructive here. Large upfront costs deliver benefits that can take decades to materialise – and can just as easily fail to materialise at all. Japan spent trillions on prestige infrastructure and built bridges to nowhere. Spain constructed airports that saw no planes. The presence of steel and tarmac does not guarantee the economic activity that was supposed to justify it. None of this is to say the Agratas deal is wrong. A £4bn factory, up to 4,000 jobs, and an anchor role in the UK’s EV supply chain is a transformative prize for Somerset. The council may well have made the right call. But “the right call” and “a rigorously tested 25-year financial model” are not the same thing, and the distinction matters. As more corporations – often with the blessing of enterprise zone designations – look to substitute upfront infrastructure investment for ongoing tax obligations, local authorities need independent analytical frameworks to evaluate these deals properly. The asymmetry of information and negotiating power between a global conglomerate and a county council is considerable. The question we should all be asking is not whether Agratas is a good corporate citizen – by all accounts it is working hard to embed itself in the Somerset community. The question is structural: when a company writes the cheque for the roads it needs to operate, who is really getting the better end of the deal? Twenty-five years is a long time. It would be reassuring to know that someone has done the maths with genuine rigour – and published it.
Charles Percehron – Our Energy Expert Speaks to Le Monde
17 March 2026 Below is an article published by Le Monde. It features our colleague Charles PERCHERON, and Kpler and its work using the latest technology to help map energy flows; highly recommended reading in the current geo-political context in the Persian Gulf. https://lnkd.in/e6kgDGAn
Did you know you can trade lean hogs on the stock market? 🐷
25 February 2026 No, really. Alongside live cattle, oats, frozen orange juice and cocoa futures, lean hog contracts are genuinely traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange – in lots of 40,000 pounds, no less. We’re not making this up. It turns out the world of commodity trading goes way beyond the gold bars and oil barrels most people picture. Here are five “exotic” soft commodities that serious traders are watching right now: ☕ Coffee – A billion daily drinkers means relentless demand. But Brazilian soil moisture levels, Vietnamese harvest delays and tropical storms all move the price. Your morning flat white is a geopolitical event. 🍫 Cocoa – In 2024, Côte d’Ivoire cut its export contracts by 40% due to poor weather. Ghana fared little better. Two countries produce half the world’s supply — so when West Africa sneezes, the chocolate market catches a cold. 🌾 Oats – Grown across the EU, Russia, Canada and Australia, oats are more globally distributed than most soft commodities. But here’s the twist: disruption in one grain market tends to ripple across all grains, because they share the same growing regions, transport networks and storage systems. 🥩 Lean hogs and live cattle – Alternative proteins are getting all the headlines. Meanwhile, global meat consumption keeps rising. Livestock futures are a quiet corner of the market that demographic trends suggest won’t stay quiet for long. 🍊 Frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) – Yes, it has its own futures market. In 2024, it hit all-time highs after disease-carrying sap-sucking insects devastated crops in Brazil (which produces nearly 70% of the world’s OJ) and a series of hurricanes compounded the damage in Florida. Extraordinary volatility in the most ordinary of breakfast staples. The common thread? These markets are driven by weather, disease, geography and human appetite — not by central bank policy or tech earnings cycles. For traders and commodity professionals who understand the supply side, that’s a very different — and potentially very interesting — kind of opportunity. Over to you. At Gapuma Group, we’re always curious about the commodity experiences that don’t make the standard textbooks. Have you ever dealt in something genuinely unusual — whether that’s a niche agricultural product, a regional soft commodity, or something else entirely that raised eyebrows at the trading desk?
US Tariff Uncertainty: The enemy of business isn’t the tariff. It’s the chaos surrounding it
24 February 2026 When the US Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s use of emergency powers under IEEPA to impose sweeping global tariffs, markets briefly exhaled. That relief lasted roughly 24 hours. Within a day, the administration had invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act – a statute never previously used – to reimpose a 15% universal tariff rate. The EU, which had recently concluded what it believed was a settled trade agreement with Washington, was blunt in its response: “A deal is a deal.” It was also, apparently, an optimistic assumption. This is the central problem. Tariffs, as a tool of economic policy, are not inherently lethal to global trade. They raise costs, they distort supply chains, they disproportionately burden weaker economies – applying identical flat rates to Bangladesh and Germany is not a neutral act – but businesses can adapt to a fixed landscape. They reprice, they reroute, they renegotiate. What they cannot do is build rational strategy on shifting sand. Fitch Ratings has noted that despite any temporary respite, US corporates continue to face renewed uncertainty, with supply chain and margin planning effectively on hold. Reuters similarly observed that the Supreme Court ruling, whilst constraining presidential power, has not resolved the fundamental instability facing trading partners. The irony is that judicial intervention – designed as a corrective – has, at least in the short term, amplified the turbulence rather than contained it. Every legal challenge resets the clock without resetting the uncertainty. At Gapuma Group, we work across markets where predictability underpins investment decisions. What we are watching now is not the tariff level. It is the governance of trade policy itself – and that, at present, offers little comfort.