The Emperor Comes to Beijing — Without His Clothes
14 May 2026 By: Shahab MOSSAVAT When Donald Trump first touched down in Beijing in November 2017, Xi Jinping laid on the full theatre of imperial hospitality: a private dinner in the Forbidden City, a parade through Tiananmen Square, and the announcement of $250 billion in business deals – a figure so grand it dwarfed the entire annual GDP of West Virginia, where one of its headline memoranda of understanding was supposedly centred. Almost none of it materialised. The symbolism, however, was exquisitely chosen. China was telling the world – and telling Trump – who was truly in charge. Nine years on, the pageantry at Beijing Capital International Airport on Wednesday – the honour guard, the schoolchildren chanting in Mandarin, the skyscrapers lit with welcoming characters – carried an almost identical message, delivered with rather more pointed subtlety. Air Force One landed, and a US president who had spent his first term threatening to break China, and his second term actually trying to, stepped onto a red carpet laid by a nation that had absorbed his blows, weaponised its advantages in response, and emerged from the encounter structurally stronger. Donald Trump is greeted at Beijing airport by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng The shift in the bilateral power dynamic is not subtle. It is measurable, documented and, for Washington, deeply uncomfortable. When Trump arrived in 2017, the United States still held most of the conventional cards: it was the world’s pre-eminent consumer market, the anchor of the dollar-denominated global financial system, and the unchallenged custodian of the rules-based international order. China was formidable but still, in important respects, dependent – on American technology, American markets and American acquiescence. Trump’s instinct, brutal in its simplicity, was to exploit that dependency through tariffs. What he did not foresee was that a decade of patient strategic investment had quietly altered the underlying geometry. Consider the arithmetic of the current summit. Trump arrives in Beijing wanting concessions: market entry for American companies, Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft and US soybeans, a softening of rare earth export restrictions that brought his own industrial economy to the edge of a supply crisis. Xi, by contrast, wants stability – time to consolidate a technological and industrial position that has already, by most independent assessments, reached escape velocity. The asymmetry is telling. One leader is shopping for wins to take home to voters ahead of bruising midterm elections. The other is managing a civilisational project measured in decades. Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it with characteristic precision in CNBC on the day the summit opened: “China comes into this meeting far more confident than in 2017, when it feared even a small rise in US tariffs. In the last year, Xi has been able to push back and neutralise much of Trump’s actions.” 2017 v 2026: Change in Body Language? Central to China’s structural advantage is its commanding position in the global shipping and logistics system – a dominance so comprehensive that it shapes the price of practically everything that moves by sea. By mid-2024, China had invested in ports in 16 of the top 20 nations for shipping connectivity. Roughly 27 per cent of global container trade now passes through terminals partly or wholly owned by Chinese or Hong Kong-based companies. In 2024 alone, China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder produced more commercial tonnage than the entire United States shipbuilding industry has delivered since the Second World War. Shanghai handled 51.5 million TEUs in 2024, making it the world’s busiest port – five times the throughput of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined. When China flexes its position in containerised freight, it is not merely adjusting a commercial variable. It is moving a lever that governs global commodity pricing across industries from automotive parts to pharmaceuticals, from agricultural produce to consumer electronics. The United States, which conducts the overwhelming majority of its trade by sea, sits downstream of that lever. Underpinning this logistical supremacy is a strategic energy architecture that took shape long before Trump’s tariff wars began. China’s early and consistent investment in Iranian crude – formalised in the 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement whose foundations Xi Jinping himself proposed during a 2016 visit to Tehran – secured access to oil trading at an $8–10 discount per barrel below global benchmarks. While Western economies lurched from one energy shock to the next, buffeted by sanctions regimes and geopolitical crises they themselves often authored, Beijing was buying Iranian crude at predictable, heavily discounted rates through independent refiners insulated from direct sanction exposure. More broadly, Xi’s decade-long programme of energy self-sufficiency – wind, solar, hydropower, domestic drilling and diversified import partnerships – has positioned China to weather disruptions that send other economies into crisis. The current US-Israel war against Iran, which has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and sent global energy prices spiralling, is a case in point. China’s energy fortress, as analysts at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy have noted, appears to be passing its sternest test. That cannot be said of the United States. Yangshan: The world’s busiest container port handling more than 50 million TEUs annually The technological transformation is perhaps the most significant shift of all. China is no longer, in any meaningful sense, the cheap-labour assembly floor of the global economy. Its “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy has delivered on its core promises with a thoroughness that has alarmed Western analysts. China now leads the world in industrial robotics installations, dominates the clean technology supply chain from lithium batteries to solar panels, and – with DeepSeek’s R1 model launching in early 2025 to international astonishment – has demonstrated serious, applied artificial intelligence capability that challenges American primacy in what was supposed to be a US-led domain. In rare earths, which sit at the chokepoint of every advanced technology from fighter jets to electric vehicles to AI semiconductors, Beijing controls 85–90 per cent of […]
US Tariff Uncertainty: The enemy of business isn’t the tariff. It’s the chaos surrounding it
24 February 2026 When the US Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s use of emergency powers under IEEPA to impose sweeping global tariffs, markets briefly exhaled. That relief lasted roughly 24 hours. Within a day, the administration had invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act – a statute never previously used – to reimpose a 15% universal tariff rate. The EU, which had recently concluded what it believed was a settled trade agreement with Washington, was blunt in its response: “A deal is a deal.” It was also, apparently, an optimistic assumption. This is the central problem. Tariffs, as a tool of economic policy, are not inherently lethal to global trade. They raise costs, they distort supply chains, they disproportionately burden weaker economies – applying identical flat rates to Bangladesh and Germany is not a neutral act – but businesses can adapt to a fixed landscape. They reprice, they reroute, they renegotiate. What they cannot do is build rational strategy on shifting sand. Fitch Ratings has noted that despite any temporary respite, US corporates continue to face renewed uncertainty, with supply chain and margin planning effectively on hold. Reuters similarly observed that the Supreme Court ruling, whilst constraining presidential power, has not resolved the fundamental instability facing trading partners. The irony is that judicial intervention – designed as a corrective – has, at least in the short term, amplified the turbulence rather than contained it. Every legal challenge resets the clock without resetting the uncertainty. At Gapuma Group, we work across markets where predictability underpins investment decisions. What we are watching now is not the tariff level. It is the governance of trade policy itself – and that, at present, offers little comfort.
Is China Winning Because of Tariffs, Not Despite Them?
14th January 2026 China’s record $1.19 trillion trade surplus for 2025 poses an intriguing question: are tariffs inadvertently strengthening Beijing’s global position? Whilst Trump’s levies successfully reduced US-China trade, they’ve seemingly accelerated an unintended consequence: China’s pivot towards emerging markets. As weaker economies struggle with rising input costs and disrupted supply chains, China has expanded aggressively into Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America—regions where competitors lack its manufacturing scale and infrastructure depth. According to the Financial Times, China’s export machine has proved “remarkably resilient,” with green technology and AI products driving growth in new markets. The Economist notes that whilst other exporters face margin pressure from tariffs, China’s vast domestic production capacity allows it to absorb costs and undercut rivals who cannot. This creates a troubling dynamic: tariffs intended to level the playing field may actually consolidate China’s dominance. Smaller economies face a double burden—higher costs from tariffs whilst simultaneously losing market share to Chinese alternatives in third countries. Bloomberg data shows Chinese goods penetrating markets previously served by Southeast Asian manufacturers, as buyers seek the lowest prices amidst global inflation. The paradox is striking. Punitive measures meant to constrain China may be eliminating its mid-tier competition instead. With a weak yuan, overcapacity from its property crisis, and unmatched scale, China can weather storms that sink smaller vessels. The question for businesses isn’t whether to prepare for a China-dominated supply landscape—it’s whether current trade policies are accelerating rather than preventing it. Perhaps scale, not sanctions, determines who survives the tariff era.
Tesla’s Profit Slide Highlights Mounting Pressures on Global Manufacturing
23rd October 2025 Tesla has reported record quarterly revenues of almost $28 billion for the three months to the end of September, yet profits fell by more than a third — a stark illustration of the financial pressures now bearing down on global manufacturers. The company cited higher tariffs on imported components and raw materials, increased logistics and energy costs, and substantial investment in research and development, particularly in artificial intelligence. Although demand remained strong, helped by a final wave of buyers seeking to claim expiring US electric vehicle tax credits, these gains were eclipsed by rapidly rising operating expenses. The strain facing Tesla is emblematic of a broader challenge across heavy industry. Manufacturers continue to contend with post-pandemic bottlenecks, volatile freight rates, inflation in energy and labour markets, and ongoing geopolitical uncertainty. Shifting trade policies have prompted many companies to rethink their sourcing models, often prioritising resilience over efficiency. Volume alone is no longer a guarantee of profitability. In an era defined by fragile supply chains and heightened cost pressures, success increasingly hinges on strategic procurement, agile logistics management, and a diversified supplier network. For Gapuma and its global partners in the industrial and chemical sectors, Tesla’s experience underscores the importance of reinforcing resilience at every stage of the value chain. The ability to anticipate disruption, optimise sourcing, and contain input costs has become essential to maintaining competitiveness in today’s unpredictable marketplace.
Tariffs, Supply Constraints, and Falling Crop Prices Put U.S. Fertiliser Market Under Strain
23rd July 2025 A detailed analysis by Argus Media, supported by reporting from sector commentators Calder Jett, Sneha Kumar, Chris Mullins, and Taylor Zavala, highlights the growing pressures on the U.S. fertiliser market as the autumn application season approaches. Insights shared during the recent Southwestern Fertilizer Conference in Nashville have drawn attention to several critical challenges currently affecting the market: 🔻 The Argus Fertilizer Affordability Index has dropped sharply to 0.71 — significantly below the benchmark of 1, and its lowest level since April 2022.🚢 A 10% import tariff introduced in April is tightening offshore supply at a time when the U.S. market is heavily reliant on imports to satisfy domestic demand.🌽 Expectations of a bumper corn crop are putting further strain on inventories while simultaneously driving down corn futures, reducing affordability for growers.🛑 Many wholesalers and retailers are opting to delay their autumn fertiliser purchases to avoid high upfront costs and storage challenges — with phosphates and potash particularly affected. The outlook remains uncertain. By 1 August, additional and potentially higher duties may be imposed on fertiliser imports from Algeria, the EU, Tunisia, Brunei, and Indonesia — countries which together accounted for more than 13% of U.S. fertiliser imports last year. This added layer of complexity is especially significant in the nitrogen segment, where supplies remain limited due to low global inventories and continuing geopolitical disruptions. With coverage also featured in World Fertilizer Magazine, this story is expected to remain a major talking point across the industry in the coming weeks.