The Barrel: The last place the story shows up
9 July 2026 When the US–Iran ceasefire collapsed in the Strait of Hormuz this week, the headlines went straight to price. Brent ticked up, then wobbled either way, and most commentary moved on. But for the companies that actually move oil, gas and chemicals through that water, the price is not the problem. The problem is everything sitting underneath it. Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil and LNG. That makes route reliability a commercial contract in its own right, and it is precisely the thing a trader cannot hedge. You can hedge crude. You cannot hedge a captain who refuses to enter a severe-risk zone, an insurer who rewrites a war-risk exclusion overnight, or a payment rail that quietly narrows while your cargo is still mid-voyage. That last point is the one keeping people up. A US general licence opened a legal corridor for Iranian oil on 21 June. Within roughly a fortnight it was revoked and replaced with a wind-down order. Legal permission, it turns out, is not the same as bankable confidence, and each transaction now carries a lifecycle risk that is far harder to price than the commodity itself. This is why so many commodities businesses are in a genuine tailspin right now. The instinct is to watch the screen. But the screen is a lagging indicator. A vessel that turns back, an insurer that hesitates, a bank that declines a settlement, none of it registers immediately as a shortage. It registers as friction. Friction compounds quietly, and by the time it reaches the price, the decision you needed to make was already late. The firms that come through this well will not be the ones with the best price call. They will be the ones who treated the route, the licence and the counterparty as three separate clocks, and started tracking all three before the market did. Strategy in this environment is not prediction. It is knowing which questions to ask, and asking them early. Gapuma Group | Trading commodities and speciality chemicals across international markets, with a clear read on the ground beneath the price.
🛢️ GAPUMA GROUP | MARKET INTELLIGENCE | 20 MAY 2026
Hormuz, Beijing and Moscow: The Geopolitics of Oil Are Being Rewritten in Real Time The movement of two Chinese supertankers through the Strait of Hormuz today – the Yuan Gui Yang and Ocean Lily, carrying approximately 4 million barrels of crude after waiting in the Gulf for more than two months – has sent an immediate and unmistakeable signal to commodity markets. Brent crude fell to as low as $110.16 a barrel on the news. This is not merely a shipping story. It is a geopolitical statement. The vessels’ passage comes as President Trump and President Xi concluded a two-day summit in Beijing, with a White House official describing the talks as “good.” US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC that China would work behind the scenes to help reopen the strait, noting that Beijing has “a much bigger interest in reopening the strait than the US does.” Beijing, characteristically, said nothing publicly about Hormuz – Chinese state media reported only that the leaders “exchanged views on major international and regional issues, such as the Middle East situation.” Silence, in diplomacy, is often the loudest language. Iran has reportedly sought to implement a toll system for vessels crossing Hormuz – a brazen assertion of sovereign authority over an international waterway that carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply. That Chinese-flagged supertankers are now moving freely while broader restrictions remain in place is a pointed reminder of where true leverage lies. Meanwhile, closer to home, Prime Minister Keir Starmer has authorised the import of Russian-refined diesel and jet fuel into the UK indefinitely, alongside a temporary licence permitting the maritime transport of Russian LNG from the Sakhalin-2 and Yamal terminals. The government frames it as pragmatism. Treasury Minister Dan Tomlinson told Sky News the government was “acting pragmatically to insulate British citizens from the economic fallout of the Middle East conflict.” Critics – not least opposition leader Kemi Badenoch – see it differently: as analysts have noted, from Moscow’s perspective, it demonstrates that Western countries are “not that committed to a sanctions regime” when their own consumers feel the pinch. The broader picture is stark. Global oil supply has declined by 12.8 mb/d in total since February, with output from Gulf countries affected by the Strait’s closure running 14.4 mb/d below pre-war levels. The IEA projects a decline of 3.9 mb/d on average across 2026, assuming flows gradually resume from June. The United Nations has already cut its global growth forecast to 2.5% this year, against an estimated 3% last year, citing higher energy costs and weaker trade. For commodities and futures desks, the key questions now are whether today’s tanker movements represent a genuine reopening or a bilateral Chinese carve-out – and whether the gap between the two matters less than markets think. Wood Mackenzie has estimated Brent could approach $200 a barrel if the Strait remains largely shut until the end of the year. The downside scenario, by contrast, assumes a rapid diplomatic resolution that supply chains are ill-prepared to absorb smoothly. At Gapuma Group, we are watching these developments closely across energy, commodities and futures markets. The rules of the game are changing – and the players setting them are not all where they used to be. For market intelligence, trading insights and strategic analysis, connect with the Gapuma Group team.
The Emperor Comes to Beijing — Without His Clothes
14 May 2026 By: Shahab MOSSAVAT When Donald Trump first touched down in Beijing in November 2017, Xi Jinping laid on the full theatre of imperial hospitality: a private dinner in the Forbidden City, a parade through Tiananmen Square, and the announcement of $250 billion in business deals – a figure so grand it dwarfed the entire annual GDP of West Virginia, where one of its headline memoranda of understanding was supposedly centred. Almost none of it materialised. The symbolism, however, was exquisitely chosen. China was telling the world – and telling Trump – who was truly in charge. Nine years on, the pageantry at Beijing Capital International Airport on Wednesday – the honour guard, the schoolchildren chanting in Mandarin, the skyscrapers lit with welcoming characters – carried an almost identical message, delivered with rather more pointed subtlety. Air Force One landed, and a US president who had spent his first term threatening to break China, and his second term actually trying to, stepped onto a red carpet laid by a nation that had absorbed his blows, weaponised its advantages in response, and emerged from the encounter structurally stronger. Donald Trump is greeted at Beijing airport by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng The shift in the bilateral power dynamic is not subtle. It is measurable, documented and, for Washington, deeply uncomfortable. When Trump arrived in 2017, the United States still held most of the conventional cards: it was the world’s pre-eminent consumer market, the anchor of the dollar-denominated global financial system, and the unchallenged custodian of the rules-based international order. China was formidable but still, in important respects, dependent – on American technology, American markets and American acquiescence. Trump’s instinct, brutal in its simplicity, was to exploit that dependency through tariffs. What he did not foresee was that a decade of patient strategic investment had quietly altered the underlying geometry. Consider the arithmetic of the current summit. Trump arrives in Beijing wanting concessions: market entry for American companies, Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft and US soybeans, a softening of rare earth export restrictions that brought his own industrial economy to the edge of a supply crisis. Xi, by contrast, wants stability – time to consolidate a technological and industrial position that has already, by most independent assessments, reached escape velocity. The asymmetry is telling. One leader is shopping for wins to take home to voters ahead of bruising midterm elections. The other is managing a civilisational project measured in decades. Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it with characteristic precision in CNBC on the day the summit opened: “China comes into this meeting far more confident than in 2017, when it feared even a small rise in US tariffs. In the last year, Xi has been able to push back and neutralise much of Trump’s actions.” 2017 v 2026: Change in Body Language? Central to China’s structural advantage is its commanding position in the global shipping and logistics system – a dominance so comprehensive that it shapes the price of practically everything that moves by sea. By mid-2024, China had invested in ports in 16 of the top 20 nations for shipping connectivity. Roughly 27 per cent of global container trade now passes through terminals partly or wholly owned by Chinese or Hong Kong-based companies. In 2024 alone, China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder produced more commercial tonnage than the entire United States shipbuilding industry has delivered since the Second World War. Shanghai handled 51.5 million TEUs in 2024, making it the world’s busiest port – five times the throughput of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined. When China flexes its position in containerised freight, it is not merely adjusting a commercial variable. It is moving a lever that governs global commodity pricing across industries from automotive parts to pharmaceuticals, from agricultural produce to consumer electronics. The United States, which conducts the overwhelming majority of its trade by sea, sits downstream of that lever. Underpinning this logistical supremacy is a strategic energy architecture that took shape long before Trump’s tariff wars began. China’s early and consistent investment in Iranian crude – formalised in the 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement whose foundations Xi Jinping himself proposed during a 2016 visit to Tehran – secured access to oil trading at an $8–10 discount per barrel below global benchmarks. While Western economies lurched from one energy shock to the next, buffeted by sanctions regimes and geopolitical crises they themselves often authored, Beijing was buying Iranian crude at predictable, heavily discounted rates through independent refiners insulated from direct sanction exposure. More broadly, Xi’s decade-long programme of energy self-sufficiency – wind, solar, hydropower, domestic drilling and diversified import partnerships – has positioned China to weather disruptions that send other economies into crisis. The current US-Israel war against Iran, which has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and sent global energy prices spiralling, is a case in point. China’s energy fortress, as analysts at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy have noted, appears to be passing its sternest test. That cannot be said of the United States. Yangshan: The world’s busiest container port handling more than 50 million TEUs annually The technological transformation is perhaps the most significant shift of all. China is no longer, in any meaningful sense, the cheap-labour assembly floor of the global economy. Its “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy has delivered on its core promises with a thoroughness that has alarmed Western analysts. China now leads the world in industrial robotics installations, dominates the clean technology supply chain from lithium batteries to solar panels, and – with DeepSeek’s R1 model launching in early 2025 to international astonishment – has demonstrated serious, applied artificial intelligence capability that challenges American primacy in what was supposed to be a US-led domain. In rare earths, which sit at the chokepoint of every advanced technology from fighter jets to electric vehicles to AI semiconductors, Beijing controls 85–90 per cent of […]
Is comprehensive globalism over?
What the Iran War means for physical commodity traders 24 March 2026 The Financial Times has been asking hard questions about the structural shift now under way in global business – and the conclusions demand attention from anyone in physical commodities. FT chief economics commentator Martin Wolf is unambiguous: “The worst case is that this will be one of the biggest shocks in the postwar period.” Meanwhile, FT columnist Tej Parikh cuts to a deeper vulnerability: “Investors have committed trillions of dollars to the technology, one of the most power-hungry inventions ever, on the assumption of ample energy supplies and a slick chip production line that can cross more than 70 borders before reaching the final consumer. But the Iran war is exposing the fragilities in the AI supply chain.” If that assumption of frictionless global logistics is now in doubt for the digital economy, it raises an equally sharp question for physical commodity traders: is the model of seamless, borderless trade still viable? The honest answer is: not unconditionally. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated that a single chokepoint can simultaneously disrupt energy, fertiliser, industrial gases and shipping insurance markets. Supply chains engineered for efficiency rather than resilience are being exposed for what they are. Three conclusions stand out. Hyper-globalised sourcing is a liability without redundancy built in. Global trade is not over, but it is being repriced around risk. And those with established local distribution networks are navigating this crisis measurably better than those dependent on long, centralised chains. Jack Bardakjian, Group Managing Director of Gapuma Group, is direct on this point: “Every experienced commodity trader understands that price is only half the equation – the other half is access. When the architecture of global trade is under this kind of stress, access becomes everything. Local presence, local relationships, local knowledge – these are not peripheral considerations. They are the hard infrastructure of the business.” The world will trade again. But the terms on which it does so are being rewritten. Primary source: Financial Times, 12 March 2026, and related FT reporting
US Tariff Uncertainty: The enemy of business isn’t the tariff. It’s the chaos surrounding it
24 February 2026 When the US Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s use of emergency powers under IEEPA to impose sweeping global tariffs, markets briefly exhaled. That relief lasted roughly 24 hours. Within a day, the administration had invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act – a statute never previously used – to reimpose a 15% universal tariff rate. The EU, which had recently concluded what it believed was a settled trade agreement with Washington, was blunt in its response: “A deal is a deal.” It was also, apparently, an optimistic assumption. This is the central problem. Tariffs, as a tool of economic policy, are not inherently lethal to global trade. They raise costs, they distort supply chains, they disproportionately burden weaker economies – applying identical flat rates to Bangladesh and Germany is not a neutral act – but businesses can adapt to a fixed landscape. They reprice, they reroute, they renegotiate. What they cannot do is build rational strategy on shifting sand. Fitch Ratings has noted that despite any temporary respite, US corporates continue to face renewed uncertainty, with supply chain and margin planning effectively on hold. Reuters similarly observed that the Supreme Court ruling, whilst constraining presidential power, has not resolved the fundamental instability facing trading partners. The irony is that judicial intervention – designed as a corrective – has, at least in the short term, amplified the turbulence rather than contained it. Every legal challenge resets the clock without resetting the uncertainty. At Gapuma Group, we work across markets where predictability underpins investment decisions. What we are watching now is not the tariff level. It is the governance of trade policy itself – and that, at present, offers little comfort.
RAN, OIL AND THE ART OF THE CONVENIENT CRISIS
19 February 2026 Brent crude pushed above $71.50 yesterday. WTI broke $66. A 4% surge in a single session, with more to follow in early European trading. The headlines wrote themselves: US-Iran tensions, Strait of Hormuz fears, military build-up in the Persian Gulf. All of that is real. But is geopolitical risk genuinely driving this spike, or is it doing the market a useful favour — providing cover for something more structurally inconvenient? Here is the problem the oil market does not particularly want to discuss. The IEA’s implied surplus for 2026 has ballooned to nearly 4 million barrels per day – driven by OPEC+ unwinding its production cuts and relentless output growth from the United States, Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina. Global demand growth is forecast at just 930,000 barrels per day – tepid, weighed down by EV adoption, improving vehicle efficiency and anaemic economic conditions. On paper, this is one of the most oversupplied markets in recent memory. And yet here we are, with Brent at six-month highs. Iranian exports run at roughly 1.5 million barrels per day. Total flows through the Strait of Hormuz reach around 20 million barrels per day. A full-scale disruption would be seismic, potentially erasing the entire surplus at a stroke. The Iran risk is not imaginary. But what it conveniently masks is that the physical market is already tighter than balance sheets suggest – sanctioned oil finding fewer willing buyers, Indian refiners shunning Russian barrels, and the Brent forward curve sitting in backwardation well into 2028. That is not the shape of a market drowning in surplus. Geopolitical crises do not create oil market fundamentals. They temporarily obscure them. When the dust settles – as it eventually does – the surplus will still be there.
TRUMP’S GREENLAND GAMBIT: RARE EARTHS OR GEOPOLITICAL THEATRE?
21 January 2026 President Trump’s year-long campaign to acquire Greenland has crystallised around a stark claim: America needs control to secure critical minerals vital for military and economic security. From a commodities trading perspective, this narrative demands scrutiny. The mineral case appears compelling at first glance. Greenland holds two of the world’s largest rare earth deposits, including heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium that are essential for missile guidance systems and jet engines. China controls up to 90% of rare earth processing capacity, making supply chain diversification strategically sound. Yet the economic reality is sobering. Greenland is relatively open to investment – the US could mine there now. Only one American entity has even applied for mining permits. The challenge isn’t access; it’s mining in an incredibly harsh environment. Mining sites are remote, largely unsettled, and face local opposition. More tellingly, established supply chains already exist in the US, Canada, Australia and Brazil – markets may simply not need Greenland’s minerals. Meanwhile, 85% of Greenlanders oppose becoming American, with party leaders across the political spectrum united in rejecting US advances. The real story? Trump’s “method” reveals a strategic intent to re-establish American dominance over the western hemisphere, dividing the world into three spheres of influence. China views this as proof the US-led order is in turmoil – creating opportunities Beijing welcomes. For ESG-conscious traders, Greenland exposes the tension between resource nationalism rhetoric and commercial reality. When acquisition costs exceed value creation, and geopolitical theatre overshadows economic fundamentals, markets should take note.
Is China Winning Because of Tariffs, Not Despite Them?
14th January 2026 China’s record $1.19 trillion trade surplus for 2025 poses an intriguing question: are tariffs inadvertently strengthening Beijing’s global position? Whilst Trump’s levies successfully reduced US-China trade, they’ve seemingly accelerated an unintended consequence: China’s pivot towards emerging markets. As weaker economies struggle with rising input costs and disrupted supply chains, China has expanded aggressively into Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America—regions where competitors lack its manufacturing scale and infrastructure depth. According to the Financial Times, China’s export machine has proved “remarkably resilient,” with green technology and AI products driving growth in new markets. The Economist notes that whilst other exporters face margin pressure from tariffs, China’s vast domestic production capacity allows it to absorb costs and undercut rivals who cannot. This creates a troubling dynamic: tariffs intended to level the playing field may actually consolidate China’s dominance. Smaller economies face a double burden—higher costs from tariffs whilst simultaneously losing market share to Chinese alternatives in third countries. Bloomberg data shows Chinese goods penetrating markets previously served by Southeast Asian manufacturers, as buyers seek the lowest prices amidst global inflation. The paradox is striking. Punitive measures meant to constrain China may be eliminating its mid-tier competition instead. With a weak yuan, overcapacity from its property crisis, and unmatched scale, China can weather storms that sink smaller vessels. The question for businesses isn’t whether to prepare for a China-dominated supply landscape—it’s whether current trade policies are accelerating rather than preventing it. Perhaps scale, not sanctions, determines who survives the tariff era.
TRUMP’S IRAN TARIFF GAMBIT: A CALCULATED RISK THAT COULD RESHAPE GLOBAL TRADE
13 January 2026 Amid the chaos continuing to envelop and ravage Iran, where a large-scale protests sparked by currency collapse have been met by a brutal crackdown by authorities—with large-scale deaths and mass arrests reported—President Trump has announced immediate 25% tariffs on nations conducting business with Iran. The move introduces a new element of uncertainty into global commerce, with potentially significant ramifications for the hard-won US-China trade détente. The tariffs target major economies including China, India, Turkey, the UAE and Brazil—all substantial Iranian trading partners. China faces particular exposure, having imported approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports through independent refineries whilst maintaining over $9 billion in documented trade. The new levy could push cumulative US tariffs on Chinese goods from the current 30.8% to approximately 56%, threatening the fragile truce established at last October’s South Korea summit that granted Washington access to critical rare earth minerals. The policy’s ambiguity—Trump provided no details on what constitutes “doing business” or how enforcement will proceed—creates immediate complications for global supply chains. India’s $1.34 billion bilateral trade with Iran, Turkey’s $5.68 billion commerce across their shared border, and Brazil’s $3 billion agricultural exports all fall within potential scope. The UAE’s role as a re-export hub for Iranian goods adds further complexity to implementation. For China specifically, the stakes extend beyond trade metrics. Beijing secured rare earth export agreements and a presidential visit to China scheduled for April as part of the détente. Trump administration adviser Peter Navarro previously cautioned against escalating Chinese tariffs further, warning “we don’t want to get to a point where we hurt ourselves.” Whether carve-outs emerge remains unclear, though the White House has yet to publish legal authority or implementation details for the Iran-related levies. As businesses navigate this evolving landscape, the incident underscores how rapidly geopolitical developments can reshape commercial calculations, requiring organisations to maintain strategic flexibility in an increasingly volatile trading environment.
China’s Gold Play: Behind the $4,000 Surge?
8th October 2025 Gold’s rise beyond $4,000 an ounce marks more than a historic price point — it highlights a deeper shift in the balance of global monetary power. China’s central bank has undertaken an exceptional run of gold purchases over the past year, increasing its holdings at a pace unmatched by its other foreign exchange activities. Yet gold still represents only around 6.7 per cent of China’s immense reserves. By comparison, the United States — the world’s largest holder of gold — maintains nearly 80 per cent of its reserves in bullion, with a stockpile almost four times larger than China’s. This disparity is significant. For Beijing, accelerating its gold acquisitions is not merely an exercise in diversification. It forms part of a broader strategy: to reduce its exposure to the dollar and strengthen its position in an international system long shaped by American financial dominance. With foreign exchange reserves almost three times greater than Japan’s — the world’s second-largest — and roughly eleven times greater than America’s own reserves, China has both the scale and the strategic intent to alter the global financial equilibrium. Gold’s ascent past $4,000 therefore extends beyond traditional concerns such as inflation hedging or interest rate expectations. It reflects a wider contest centred on currency power, credibility, and the architecture of global finance itself.
Goodbye Petrodollar?
The SCO’s Growing Influence on Commodities 02 September 2025 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) may be familiar by name, but few appreciate the scale of its impact. Representing 43% of the world’s population and nearly a quarter of global GDP, the SCO is quietly reshaping global trade and commodity flows. Since the Ukraine war, trade patterns have shifted dramatically. G7 exports to Russia have collapsed, while Chinese exports have surged—transportation equipment alone is up nearly 500%. India, previously minimally reliant on Russian crude, now sources the majority of its oil from Moscow. Energy and commodity corridors are pivoting east and south. Perhaps most strikingly, SCO members are increasingly trading oil and commodities outside the dollar system, challenging financial infrastructures that have underpinned global markets for decades. For commodities players, this is not a distant geopolitical story. It represents a live reordering of supply chains, pricing systems, and financial flows, with China emerging as a primary beneficiary. Gapuma continues to monitor these developments closely, ensuring that our operations and global partnerships remain agile, informed, and aligned with evolving market realities.
Markets Eye Fiscal Tightening as Commodities Traders Brace for Ripple Effects
6th August 2025 London’s stock markets opened higher on Wednesday, with the FTSE 100 up 0.5% in early trading. Yet beneath the initial gains, warning signs are emerging for the real economy — particularly for commodities traders. Chancellor Rachel Reeves is under pressure to implement “moderate but sustained” tax rises to address a projected £41.2 billion shortfall under her fiscal stability rule. While the National Institute of Economic & Social Research has lifted its 2025 growth forecast to 1.3%, it warns of a “deteriorating” fiscal position. For physical traders such as Gapuma Group, the risks are clear. Fiscal tightening could slow demand for construction materials, chemicals, and energy products. However, the UK’s record pace of renewable energy installations signals longer-term growth in demand for critical minerals and battery components. Political risk is adding to market tension. The upcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Whitcroft, and Russian officials — scheduled just days before a ceasefire deadline in Ukraine — is fuelling uncertainty in energy markets and raising concerns over global shipping routes. Meanwhile, rising US Treasury yields point to tighter credit conditions, a key challenge for traders reliant on trade finance and freight hedging. At Gapuma, we continue to navigate these intersecting pressures, maintaining resilience in our supply chain while delivering value across global markets. SEO Meta Description:Fiscal tightening, political risk, and shifting demand patterns are testing commodities traders. Gapuma monitors global pressures while adapting to long-term opportunities.