Is comprehensive globalism over?
What the Iran War means for physical commodity traders 24 March 2026 The Financial Times has been asking hard questions about the structural shift now under way in global business – and the conclusions demand attention from anyone in physical commodities. FT chief economics commentator Martin Wolf is unambiguous: “The worst case is that this will be one of the biggest shocks in the postwar period.” Meanwhile, FT columnist Tej Parikh cuts to a deeper vulnerability: “Investors have committed trillions of dollars to the technology, one of the most power-hungry inventions ever, on the assumption of ample energy supplies and a slick chip production line that can cross more than 70 borders before reaching the final consumer. But the Iran war is exposing the fragilities in the AI supply chain.” If that assumption of frictionless global logistics is now in doubt for the digital economy, it raises an equally sharp question for physical commodity traders: is the model of seamless, borderless trade still viable? The honest answer is: not unconditionally. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated that a single chokepoint can simultaneously disrupt energy, fertiliser, industrial gases and shipping insurance markets. Supply chains engineered for efficiency rather than resilience are being exposed for what they are. Three conclusions stand out. Hyper-globalised sourcing is a liability without redundancy built in. Global trade is not over, but it is being repriced around risk. And those with established local distribution networks are navigating this crisis measurably better than those dependent on long, centralised chains. Jack Bardakjian, Group Managing Director of Gapuma Group, is direct on this point: “Every experienced commodity trader understands that price is only half the equation – the other half is access. When the architecture of global trade is under this kind of stress, access becomes everything. Local presence, local relationships, local knowledge – these are not peripheral considerations. They are the hard infrastructure of the business.” The world will trade again. But the terms on which it does so are being rewritten. Primary source: Financial Times, 12 March 2026, and related FT reporting
US Tariff Uncertainty: The enemy of business isn’t the tariff. It’s the chaos surrounding it
24 February 2026 When the US Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s use of emergency powers under IEEPA to impose sweeping global tariffs, markets briefly exhaled. That relief lasted roughly 24 hours. Within a day, the administration had invoked Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act – a statute never previously used – to reimpose a 15% universal tariff rate. The EU, which had recently concluded what it believed was a settled trade agreement with Washington, was blunt in its response: “A deal is a deal.” It was also, apparently, an optimistic assumption. This is the central problem. Tariffs, as a tool of economic policy, are not inherently lethal to global trade. They raise costs, they distort supply chains, they disproportionately burden weaker economies – applying identical flat rates to Bangladesh and Germany is not a neutral act – but businesses can adapt to a fixed landscape. They reprice, they reroute, they renegotiate. What they cannot do is build rational strategy on shifting sand. Fitch Ratings has noted that despite any temporary respite, US corporates continue to face renewed uncertainty, with supply chain and margin planning effectively on hold. Reuters similarly observed that the Supreme Court ruling, whilst constraining presidential power, has not resolved the fundamental instability facing trading partners. The irony is that judicial intervention – designed as a corrective – has, at least in the short term, amplified the turbulence rather than contained it. Every legal challenge resets the clock without resetting the uncertainty. At Gapuma Group, we work across markets where predictability underpins investment decisions. What we are watching now is not the tariff level. It is the governance of trade policy itself – and that, at present, offers little comfort.
RAN, OIL AND THE ART OF THE CONVENIENT CRISIS
19 February 2026 Brent crude pushed above $71.50 yesterday. WTI broke $66. A 4% surge in a single session, with more to follow in early European trading. The headlines wrote themselves: US-Iran tensions, Strait of Hormuz fears, military build-up in the Persian Gulf. All of that is real. But is geopolitical risk genuinely driving this spike, or is it doing the market a useful favour — providing cover for something more structurally inconvenient? Here is the problem the oil market does not particularly want to discuss. The IEA’s implied surplus for 2026 has ballooned to nearly 4 million barrels per day – driven by OPEC+ unwinding its production cuts and relentless output growth from the United States, Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina. Global demand growth is forecast at just 930,000 barrels per day – tepid, weighed down by EV adoption, improving vehicle efficiency and anaemic economic conditions. On paper, this is one of the most oversupplied markets in recent memory. And yet here we are, with Brent at six-month highs. Iranian exports run at roughly 1.5 million barrels per day. Total flows through the Strait of Hormuz reach around 20 million barrels per day. A full-scale disruption would be seismic, potentially erasing the entire surplus at a stroke. The Iran risk is not imaginary. But what it conveniently masks is that the physical market is already tighter than balance sheets suggest – sanctioned oil finding fewer willing buyers, Indian refiners shunning Russian barrels, and the Brent forward curve sitting in backwardation well into 2028. That is not the shape of a market drowning in surplus. Geopolitical crises do not create oil market fundamentals. They temporarily obscure them. When the dust settles – as it eventually does – the surplus will still be there.
TRUMP’S GREENLAND GAMBIT: RARE EARTHS OR GEOPOLITICAL THEATRE?
21 January 2026 President Trump’s year-long campaign to acquire Greenland has crystallised around a stark claim: America needs control to secure critical minerals vital for military and economic security. From a commodities trading perspective, this narrative demands scrutiny. The mineral case appears compelling at first glance. Greenland holds two of the world’s largest rare earth deposits, including heavy rare earths like dysprosium and terbium that are essential for missile guidance systems and jet engines. China controls up to 90% of rare earth processing capacity, making supply chain diversification strategically sound. Yet the economic reality is sobering. Greenland is relatively open to investment – the US could mine there now. Only one American entity has even applied for mining permits. The challenge isn’t access; it’s mining in an incredibly harsh environment. Mining sites are remote, largely unsettled, and face local opposition. More tellingly, established supply chains already exist in the US, Canada, Australia and Brazil – markets may simply not need Greenland’s minerals. Meanwhile, 85% of Greenlanders oppose becoming American, with party leaders across the political spectrum united in rejecting US advances. The real story? Trump’s “method” reveals a strategic intent to re-establish American dominance over the western hemisphere, dividing the world into three spheres of influence. China views this as proof the US-led order is in turmoil – creating opportunities Beijing welcomes. For ESG-conscious traders, Greenland exposes the tension between resource nationalism rhetoric and commercial reality. When acquisition costs exceed value creation, and geopolitical theatre overshadows economic fundamentals, markets should take note.
Is China Winning Because of Tariffs, Not Despite Them?
14th January 2026 China’s record $1.19 trillion trade surplus for 2025 poses an intriguing question: are tariffs inadvertently strengthening Beijing’s global position? Whilst Trump’s levies successfully reduced US-China trade, they’ve seemingly accelerated an unintended consequence: China’s pivot towards emerging markets. As weaker economies struggle with rising input costs and disrupted supply chains, China has expanded aggressively into Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America—regions where competitors lack its manufacturing scale and infrastructure depth. According to the Financial Times, China’s export machine has proved “remarkably resilient,” with green technology and AI products driving growth in new markets. The Economist notes that whilst other exporters face margin pressure from tariffs, China’s vast domestic production capacity allows it to absorb costs and undercut rivals who cannot. This creates a troubling dynamic: tariffs intended to level the playing field may actually consolidate China’s dominance. Smaller economies face a double burden—higher costs from tariffs whilst simultaneously losing market share to Chinese alternatives in third countries. Bloomberg data shows Chinese goods penetrating markets previously served by Southeast Asian manufacturers, as buyers seek the lowest prices amidst global inflation. The paradox is striking. Punitive measures meant to constrain China may be eliminating its mid-tier competition instead. With a weak yuan, overcapacity from its property crisis, and unmatched scale, China can weather storms that sink smaller vessels. The question for businesses isn’t whether to prepare for a China-dominated supply landscape—it’s whether current trade policies are accelerating rather than preventing it. Perhaps scale, not sanctions, determines who survives the tariff era.
TRUMP’S IRAN TARIFF GAMBIT: A CALCULATED RISK THAT COULD RESHAPE GLOBAL TRADE
13 January 2026 Amid the chaos continuing to envelop and ravage Iran, where a large-scale protests sparked by currency collapse have been met by a brutal crackdown by authorities—with large-scale deaths and mass arrests reported—President Trump has announced immediate 25% tariffs on nations conducting business with Iran. The move introduces a new element of uncertainty into global commerce, with potentially significant ramifications for the hard-won US-China trade détente. The tariffs target major economies including China, India, Turkey, the UAE and Brazil—all substantial Iranian trading partners. China faces particular exposure, having imported approximately 90% of Iran’s oil exports through independent refineries whilst maintaining over $9 billion in documented trade. The new levy could push cumulative US tariffs on Chinese goods from the current 30.8% to approximately 56%, threatening the fragile truce established at last October’s South Korea summit that granted Washington access to critical rare earth minerals. The policy’s ambiguity—Trump provided no details on what constitutes “doing business” or how enforcement will proceed—creates immediate complications for global supply chains. India’s $1.34 billion bilateral trade with Iran, Turkey’s $5.68 billion commerce across their shared border, and Brazil’s $3 billion agricultural exports all fall within potential scope. The UAE’s role as a re-export hub for Iranian goods adds further complexity to implementation. For China specifically, the stakes extend beyond trade metrics. Beijing secured rare earth export agreements and a presidential visit to China scheduled for April as part of the détente. Trump administration adviser Peter Navarro previously cautioned against escalating Chinese tariffs further, warning “we don’t want to get to a point where we hurt ourselves.” Whether carve-outs emerge remains unclear, though the White House has yet to publish legal authority or implementation details for the Iran-related levies. As businesses navigate this evolving landscape, the incident underscores how rapidly geopolitical developments can reshape commercial calculations, requiring organisations to maintain strategic flexibility in an increasingly volatile trading environment.
China’s Gold Play: Behind the $4,000 Surge?
8th October 2025 Gold’s rise beyond $4,000 an ounce marks more than a historic price point — it highlights a deeper shift in the balance of global monetary power. China’s central bank has undertaken an exceptional run of gold purchases over the past year, increasing its holdings at a pace unmatched by its other foreign exchange activities. Yet gold still represents only around 6.7 per cent of China’s immense reserves. By comparison, the United States — the world’s largest holder of gold — maintains nearly 80 per cent of its reserves in bullion, with a stockpile almost four times larger than China’s. This disparity is significant. For Beijing, accelerating its gold acquisitions is not merely an exercise in diversification. It forms part of a broader strategy: to reduce its exposure to the dollar and strengthen its position in an international system long shaped by American financial dominance. With foreign exchange reserves almost three times greater than Japan’s — the world’s second-largest — and roughly eleven times greater than America’s own reserves, China has both the scale and the strategic intent to alter the global financial equilibrium. Gold’s ascent past $4,000 therefore extends beyond traditional concerns such as inflation hedging or interest rate expectations. It reflects a wider contest centred on currency power, credibility, and the architecture of global finance itself.
Goodbye Petrodollar?
The SCO’s Growing Influence on Commodities 02 September 2025 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) may be familiar by name, but few appreciate the scale of its impact. Representing 43% of the world’s population and nearly a quarter of global GDP, the SCO is quietly reshaping global trade and commodity flows. Since the Ukraine war, trade patterns have shifted dramatically. G7 exports to Russia have collapsed, while Chinese exports have surged—transportation equipment alone is up nearly 500%. India, previously minimally reliant on Russian crude, now sources the majority of its oil from Moscow. Energy and commodity corridors are pivoting east and south. Perhaps most strikingly, SCO members are increasingly trading oil and commodities outside the dollar system, challenging financial infrastructures that have underpinned global markets for decades. For commodities players, this is not a distant geopolitical story. It represents a live reordering of supply chains, pricing systems, and financial flows, with China emerging as a primary beneficiary. Gapuma continues to monitor these developments closely, ensuring that our operations and global partnerships remain agile, informed, and aligned with evolving market realities.
Markets Eye Fiscal Tightening as Commodities Traders Brace for Ripple Effects
6th August 2025 London’s stock markets opened higher on Wednesday, with the FTSE 100 up 0.5% in early trading. Yet beneath the initial gains, warning signs are emerging for the real economy — particularly for commodities traders. Chancellor Rachel Reeves is under pressure to implement “moderate but sustained” tax rises to address a projected £41.2 billion shortfall under her fiscal stability rule. While the National Institute of Economic & Social Research has lifted its 2025 growth forecast to 1.3%, it warns of a “deteriorating” fiscal position. For physical traders such as Gapuma Group, the risks are clear. Fiscal tightening could slow demand for construction materials, chemicals, and energy products. However, the UK’s record pace of renewable energy installations signals longer-term growth in demand for critical minerals and battery components. Political risk is adding to market tension. The upcoming meeting between US President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Whitcroft, and Russian officials — scheduled just days before a ceasefire deadline in Ukraine — is fuelling uncertainty in energy markets and raising concerns over global shipping routes. Meanwhile, rising US Treasury yields point to tighter credit conditions, a key challenge for traders reliant on trade finance and freight hedging. At Gapuma, we continue to navigate these intersecting pressures, maintaining resilience in our supply chain while delivering value across global markets. SEO Meta Description:Fiscal tightening, political risk, and shifting demand patterns are testing commodities traders. Gapuma monitors global pressures while adapting to long-term opportunities.
Tariffs, Supply Constraints, and Falling Crop Prices Put U.S. Fertiliser Market Under Strain
23rd July 2025 A detailed analysis by Argus Media, supported by reporting from sector commentators Calder Jett, Sneha Kumar, Chris Mullins, and Taylor Zavala, highlights the growing pressures on the U.S. fertiliser market as the autumn application season approaches. Insights shared during the recent Southwestern Fertilizer Conference in Nashville have drawn attention to several critical challenges currently affecting the market: 🔻 The Argus Fertilizer Affordability Index has dropped sharply to 0.71 — significantly below the benchmark of 1, and its lowest level since April 2022.🚢 A 10% import tariff introduced in April is tightening offshore supply at a time when the U.S. market is heavily reliant on imports to satisfy domestic demand.🌽 Expectations of a bumper corn crop are putting further strain on inventories while simultaneously driving down corn futures, reducing affordability for growers.🛑 Many wholesalers and retailers are opting to delay their autumn fertiliser purchases to avoid high upfront costs and storage challenges — with phosphates and potash particularly affected. The outlook remains uncertain. By 1 August, additional and potentially higher duties may be imposed on fertiliser imports from Algeria, the EU, Tunisia, Brunei, and Indonesia — countries which together accounted for more than 13% of U.S. fertiliser imports last year. This added layer of complexity is especially significant in the nitrogen segment, where supplies remain limited due to low global inventories and continuing geopolitical disruptions. With coverage also featured in World Fertilizer Magazine, this story is expected to remain a major talking point across the industry in the coming weeks.
The Return of the Special Relationship…
– Or Just the Shape of Trade to Come? 18th June 2025 While all eyes at the G7 summit were trained on the West’s fractured response to the escalating crisis in the Middle East, a quieter but potentially more consequential event took place on the sidelines. The United Kingdom and the United States finalised a long‑anticipated bilateral trade agreement—a milestone that may signal not only a new phase in transatlantic relations, but also a broader reshaping of global trade norms in an era defined by protectionism, realpolitik, and shifting alliances. A Deal for the Times The trade deal, while modest in scope, is politically significant. It reaffirms the mutual recognition of standards in critical sectors such as pharmaceuticals, financial services, and data flows. It also streamlines customs procedures and seeks to reduce certain non‑tariff barriers that have emerged post‑Brexit. Importantly, it locks in preferential terms for select British exports—steel, whisky, and automotive parts among them. But the concessions haven’t all been one‑way. The UK has agreed to allow greater access for certain US agricultural products, and has aligned with Washington’s digital‑service standards—seen by many as a departure from the EU’s more stringent regulatory model. While the British government is touting the agreement as a “pragmatic and future‑facing pact”, some in Westminster are privately acknowledging it as a necessary compromise to maintain relevance in a world where multilateralism is faltering. A New Bilateral Era? This agreement may well be a harbinger of things to come. With the World Trade Organization increasingly sidelined and the multilateral order under strain, bilateral treaties are fast becoming the architecture of modern commerce. As the Trump administration doubles down on “America First” trade policies, countries like the UK find themselves negotiating from a weaker hand—but with greater flexibility. Bilateralism allows for bespoke agreements, faster turnarounds, and the potential for more innovative cooperation, particularly in tech and green‑energy sectors. Indeed, Washington is currently in informal talks with India, and has floated trialling sector‑specific pacts with select Indo‑Pacific nations. It’s no coincidence that a resurgent United States is choosing bilateral forums over multilateral platforms—the former provides leverage, while the latter demands compromise. For the UK, this means recalibrating its post‑Brexit trade strategy to favour agility over alignment. The US deal may soon be followed by refreshed terms with Canada, Japan, and perhaps even Australia. And although a comprehensive UK–EU trade upgrade remains unlikely under current circumstances, incremental sectoral add‑ons are not off the table. Starmer: Picking Up the Pieces or Stooping to Conquer London Ascendant The political subtext of the US–UK deal is just as noteworthy as its commercial implications. Keir Starmer’s government has made no secret of its ambition to rekindle the so‑called “Special Relationship”—but with a more grounded, less romanticised approach than past governments. Recent moves point to the UK becoming a go‑to diplomatic interlocutor for Washington. Earlier this year, when the US sought a neutral location to initiate talks with China on reopening commercial aviation routes and managing export controls, it didn’t choose Geneva, Brussels or Berlin. It chose London. That decision speaks volumes. As The Economist recently noted, “The UK is rapidly positioning itself as America’s most reliable European partner,” with one unnamed senior US official remarking, “We know where we stand with London—especially under Starmer.” Adding further weight, Chancellor Rachel Reeves described Britain as an “oasis of stability” for investors, citing the new US trade deal as reinforcing that confidence. Nevertheless, not everyone is convinced. Critics warn that “transactionalists cannot be trusted in dealmaking,” pointing out that by aligning too closely with a fiercely transactional Washington, “once we have agreed to Plan A… it will be very hard for us to resist a subsequent and more damaging Plan B.” In a sense, Britain is playing the long game: embedding itself as indispensable to both Washington’s economic ambitions and its broader geopolitical strategy. The Cost of Relevance Of course, such positioning comes with trade‑offs. Critics argue that the UK is playing junior partner to an increasingly transactional America—repeating concerns that echo decades of scepticism. Others contend that in a world trending towards regional blocs—the EU, ASEAN, Mercosur—Britain’s choice to pursue bilateralism might limit its influence in the long term. Still, for the moment, the strategy appears to be paying dividends. The US deal may not be the grand free‑trade agreement once promised during the Brexit campaign, but it represents a tangible pivot away from isolation and towards strategic engagement. It’s not perfect. It may not even be entirely fair. But in a fragmented global economy, it may be the best available option. More importantly, it signals that Britain is prepared to act—not just as an independent trader, but as a key geopolitical player in an increasingly uncertain world.