The relief is real… The certainty is not
1st July 2026 For four months, the price of oil has told the story of a war few people expected and fewer still know how to end. Now, as June closes, that story appears to be turning: Brent has slipped to around $73 a barrel, its steepest monthly fall since the pandemic and its worst quarter in six years. Petrol stations, freight desks and finance directors across the trading world are, for the first time since February, allowed to exhale. But exhaling is not the same as trusting what comes next. The rally in supply behind this fall in price is genuine enough. Tankers are moving through the Strait of Hormuz again, sanction waivers have loosened Iranian barrels back into a starved market, and the diplomatic language out of Washington and Tehran has, briefly, softened. Yet scratch beneath the relief and the foundations look considerably less solid than the headline number suggests. The current arrangement holding the strait open is not a settlement; it is a temporary courtesy, with Iran having agreed to forgo transit fees for just sixty days and reserving the right to reinstate them the moment that window closes. A ceasefire with an expiry date is not peace. It is an interval. It is worth asking, too, who is actually behind the falling price, because the answer is not simply optimism. Much of this year’s most consistent buying came from trend-following hedge funds, the quiet, algorithm-driven money that piled into long oil positions as the conflict escalated in spring. That money is now heading for the exit, not because the war is over, but because the trade has stopped trending. What looks like the market voting for peace is, in no small part, funds voting to bank their profits before the next headline turns against them. This is a market that has grown fluent in front-running its own volatility. Even regulators have taken notice: several unusually well-timed bets against oil, placed in the minutes before key American statements on Iran this year, are now the subject of scrutiny. Ask a commodities desk how confident it feels and the honesty is telling. Callum Macpherson, head of commodities at Investec, described the situation bluntly as ultimately unsustainable, adding that markets are simply finding ways to muddle through, because the ordinary business of buying cargoes and hedging exposure cannot pause for a war to make up its mind. That, in a sentence, is the position every trading, logistics and distribution business now finds itself in. So can this easing be relied upon as the basis for forward strategy? Not yet, and arguably not for some time. A lower oil price today buys breathing room, not certainty. Freight contracts, insurance premiums and supplier terms still need to be built for a strait that could tighten again with a single statement out of Washington or Tehran. The prudent response is not to chase the rally down, but to hedge as though the ceasefire is what it has repeatedly proven itself to be this year: fragile, reversible and provisional. The deal may hold. History this year suggests we should not assume it will.
The Emperor Comes to Beijing — Without His Clothes
14 May 2026 By: Shahab MOSSAVAT When Donald Trump first touched down in Beijing in November 2017, Xi Jinping laid on the full theatre of imperial hospitality: a private dinner in the Forbidden City, a parade through Tiananmen Square, and the announcement of $250 billion in business deals – a figure so grand it dwarfed the entire annual GDP of West Virginia, where one of its headline memoranda of understanding was supposedly centred. Almost none of it materialised. The symbolism, however, was exquisitely chosen. China was telling the world – and telling Trump – who was truly in charge. Nine years on, the pageantry at Beijing Capital International Airport on Wednesday – the honour guard, the schoolchildren chanting in Mandarin, the skyscrapers lit with welcoming characters – carried an almost identical message, delivered with rather more pointed subtlety. Air Force One landed, and a US president who had spent his first term threatening to break China, and his second term actually trying to, stepped onto a red carpet laid by a nation that had absorbed his blows, weaponised its advantages in response, and emerged from the encounter structurally stronger. Donald Trump is greeted at Beijing airport by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng The shift in the bilateral power dynamic is not subtle. It is measurable, documented and, for Washington, deeply uncomfortable. When Trump arrived in 2017, the United States still held most of the conventional cards: it was the world’s pre-eminent consumer market, the anchor of the dollar-denominated global financial system, and the unchallenged custodian of the rules-based international order. China was formidable but still, in important respects, dependent – on American technology, American markets and American acquiescence. Trump’s instinct, brutal in its simplicity, was to exploit that dependency through tariffs. What he did not foresee was that a decade of patient strategic investment had quietly altered the underlying geometry. Consider the arithmetic of the current summit. Trump arrives in Beijing wanting concessions: market entry for American companies, Chinese purchases of Boeing aircraft and US soybeans, a softening of rare earth export restrictions that brought his own industrial economy to the edge of a supply crisis. Xi, by contrast, wants stability – time to consolidate a technological and industrial position that has already, by most independent assessments, reached escape velocity. The asymmetry is telling. One leader is shopping for wins to take home to voters ahead of bruising midterm elections. The other is managing a civilisational project measured in decades. Scott Kennedy, senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, put it with characteristic precision in CNBC on the day the summit opened: “China comes into this meeting far more confident than in 2017, when it feared even a small rise in US tariffs. In the last year, Xi has been able to push back and neutralise much of Trump’s actions.” 2017 v 2026: Change in Body Language? Central to China’s structural advantage is its commanding position in the global shipping and logistics system – a dominance so comprehensive that it shapes the price of practically everything that moves by sea. By mid-2024, China had invested in ports in 16 of the top 20 nations for shipping connectivity. Roughly 27 per cent of global container trade now passes through terminals partly or wholly owned by Chinese or Hong Kong-based companies. In 2024 alone, China’s largest state-owned shipbuilder produced more commercial tonnage than the entire United States shipbuilding industry has delivered since the Second World War. Shanghai handled 51.5 million TEUs in 2024, making it the world’s busiest port – five times the throughput of Los Angeles and Long Beach combined. When China flexes its position in containerised freight, it is not merely adjusting a commercial variable. It is moving a lever that governs global commodity pricing across industries from automotive parts to pharmaceuticals, from agricultural produce to consumer electronics. The United States, which conducts the overwhelming majority of its trade by sea, sits downstream of that lever. Underpinning this logistical supremacy is a strategic energy architecture that took shape long before Trump’s tariff wars began. China’s early and consistent investment in Iranian crude – formalised in the 25-year, $400 billion cooperation agreement whose foundations Xi Jinping himself proposed during a 2016 visit to Tehran – secured access to oil trading at an $8–10 discount per barrel below global benchmarks. While Western economies lurched from one energy shock to the next, buffeted by sanctions regimes and geopolitical crises they themselves often authored, Beijing was buying Iranian crude at predictable, heavily discounted rates through independent refiners insulated from direct sanction exposure. More broadly, Xi’s decade-long programme of energy self-sufficiency – wind, solar, hydropower, domestic drilling and diversified import partnerships – has positioned China to weather disruptions that send other economies into crisis. The current US-Israel war against Iran, which has blockaded the Strait of Hormuz and sent global energy prices spiralling, is a case in point. China’s energy fortress, as analysts at Columbia University’s Centre on Global Energy Policy have noted, appears to be passing its sternest test. That cannot be said of the United States. Yangshan: The world’s busiest container port handling more than 50 million TEUs annually The technological transformation is perhaps the most significant shift of all. China is no longer, in any meaningful sense, the cheap-labour assembly floor of the global economy. Its “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy has delivered on its core promises with a thoroughness that has alarmed Western analysts. China now leads the world in industrial robotics installations, dominates the clean technology supply chain from lithium batteries to solar panels, and – with DeepSeek’s R1 model launching in early 2025 to international astonishment – has demonstrated serious, applied artificial intelligence capability that challenges American primacy in what was supposed to be a US-led domain. In rare earths, which sit at the chokepoint of every advanced technology from fighter jets to electric vehicles to AI semiconductors, Beijing controls 85–90 per cent of […]
🌍 Crude Oil Instability Renews Debate on Energy Strategy
17th June 2025 Volatility in global oil markets has once again come into sharp focus as geopolitical tensions escalate in the Middle East. Crude prices have surged following recent Israeli strikes on Iranian facilities, pushing Brent close to the USD 80 mark—a level widely considered a threshold at which previously uneconomic sources of oil, such as shale and fracked reserves, start to re-enter the conversation. This development comes amid continued energy disruption caused by the war in Ukraine and increasingly fractured relations with Russia. As supply chains are tested and markets jitter, the conversation around energy resilience, security, and strategy is growing ever more urgent. At Gapuma, we remain mindful of the complex and often polarising nature of energy policy, particularly where fossil fuels such as fracked oil and gas are concerned. While fracking remains a subject of intense debate—on environmental, regulatory, and social grounds—what is undeniable is that rising oil prices tend to breathe new life into its economic case. At price points above USD 80 per barrel, advocates of fracking are likely to become more vocal, and investment interest could follow. However, it is essential to situate this debate within a broader strategic context. Short-term responses to supply shocks must not overshadow the longer-term imperative to create a more balanced and sustainable energy mix. Carbon-based fuels—while still an important part of global supply—must gradually yield to lower-emission alternatives that offer both environmental and geopolitical stability. Battery technologies, scalable renewables, green hydrogen, and smart grid infrastructure will all play increasingly pivotal roles in shaping the energy systems of tomorrow. These technologies reduce dependency on volatile imports, enhance domestic energy security, and contribute meaningfully to decarbonisation targets. As political analyst Marwan Bishara noted, “Energy has become the lifeblood of geopolitical power—a single disruption can reshape global alliances.” That reality has been laid bare in both Eastern Europe and the Gulf, and it continues to shape decision-making across boardrooms and governments alike. Reflecting on this moment, Jack Bardakjian, Gapuma’s Group Managing Director, said: “We need to be very judicious in the choices we make today to guarantee our energy security in the medium to longer term.” With the situation in Iran remaining fluid and the risk of further destabilisation high, the pressure on energy markets is likely to persist. Should a leadership vacuum emerge or regional conflict escalate, we could see further strain on oil flows and a renewed push by certain sectors for domestic energy sources, including shale and fracked hydrocarbons. Nonetheless, the long-term trajectory must point toward a healthier, more diversified global energy portfolio—one in which carbon-based fuels represent a smaller share and sustainability plays a greater role in both energy policy and investment decisions. Gapuma remains committed to providing insight and clarity at this critical junction, as markets, policymakers, and partners navigate the path ahead.